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ABSTRACT
The Case of Uneven Development in Palestine:
An Investigation of Scalar Fix as an Act of Dispossession
Sandra Lange
Israel’s assault on Gaza in December 2008 brought one of the world’s most long-standing and
hotly debated issues to the fore: the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Despite numerous
diplomatic efforts to negotiate peace, the hostilities between the two parties continue. One of the
fundamental obstacles to peace has been the highly uneven development between Israel and
Palestine, caused primarily by Israel’s continuous dispossession of Palestinian rights to land,
water and sovereignty. In order to further our understanding of this phenomenon, this thesis sets
out to examine processes of dispossession are carried out. The study therefore draws on the
geographical concept of scalar fix and investigates how scalar fix consolidates power and
functions as an act of dispossession of the Palestinian people. The analysis is based on a
conceptual framework which utilizes Harvey’s four key conditionalities of uneven geographical
development as well as his matrix of multiple spaces. Linking the concept of scalar fix to the
notion of dispossession, four types of scalar fix are identified and applied to the situation of
Palestine. Dialectics is used as a methodology, both to develop the conceptual framework and to
examine the case of dispossession in Palestine. The study finds that not only the formation of
laws and treaties, but also the efforts of various networks, along with the control of knowledge
and identity formation, constitute scalar fixes which facilitate Israel’s consolidation of power and
the act of dispossessing the people of Palestine.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
“Israel distinguished the war against terror… against Hamas…and in doing so,
we keep the situation in Gaza strip completely as it should be.” Tzipi Livni

The events of the recent months have, once again, brought one of the world’s most longstanding and hotly debated conflicts to the fore: the conflict between Israel and Palestine.
Throughout the 22 days of Israel’s assault on Gaza,1 the above statement by then Israeli foreign
minister Tzipi Livni was repeated again and again on Al Jazeera’s English news channel,
becoming ingrained into the viewer’s mind. As the figures of Palestinian casualties rose into the
thousands, one could not help but wonder about the meaning of Livni’s announcement. Did she
refer to the familiar ‘purity of arms’ doctrine, implying that civilians were not affected (unless
they had the nerve to accommodate ‘terrorists’ among their families)? Or did she indeed suggest
that the situation of utter chaos and destruction, robbing the Palestinians in Gaza of whatever
little means they had left to sustain their livelihood after 18 months of economic blockade, is
how life for the Palestinians “should be”?
Either way, the statement reflects very well the position of both the Israelis and the
Palestinians, which seems to have changed little since the beginning of this longstanding
conflict. Public opinion of the two parties appears to remain as it was: Israel, in it’s everlasting
search for ‘peace’ and ‘security’ makes use of its right to defend its population against the
‘terrorists’ who threaten the existence of the Zionist state - by throwing stones and firing homemade rockets.
Based on this commonly accepted imagery, the world sat on their hands watching Israel’s
bombardment of Gaza’s population, which had been suffering from an 18-months economic
1

The war lasted from 27 December 2008 till 18 January 2009.
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blockade, without any serious attempts of intervention. While emergency meetings and summits
were called to negotiate an end to the war, all diplomatic efforts remained without success. Even
a UN Security Council resolution - proudly presented after tedious negotiation processes calling on both parties to cease fire immediately went unheeded. Furthermore, despite the verbal
denunciation of Israel’s relentless attacks on defenseless civilians by US and European leaders,
the deliberate bombardment of humanitarian shelters organized by UNRWA (United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East), as well as other war crimes
involving the usage of illegal materials such as white phosphorus, went largely unpunished.
Instead, the blame was laid on the Gazans themselves for supporting Hamas, a resistance
movement considered a terrorist organization.
This most recent assault on the Palestinian people is not a one-time occurrence, but rather
a continuation of a long-standing conflict with no end in sight. After a century of hostility and
violence between the two people concerned, after considerable amounts of scholarship and
writing aimed to bring understanding to the issue, and, most notably, after tireless efforts of
conflict resolution and peace negotiations, the situation in the land of Palestine seems to
increasingly worsen rather than showing any improvement. Whereas Israel developed over the
centuries into one of the world's most developed states, the living conditions of the Palestinians
have been, and remain, rather appalling. Moreover, while Israelis live within the internationally
recognized borders of a sovereign state, the people of Palestine are spread over a range of
countries. Figure 1 shows the distribution of Palestinians worldwide, highlighting that almost
half the total population lives outside their homeland of Palestine. The majority of those in exile,
some 4.6 million live in the 58 refugee camps operated by UNRWA in the Middle East. 2

2

This is the official figure of the refugees registered with UNRWA. It should be noted that the actual number is
likely to be even higher, as many refugees are not officially registered.
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Figure 1: Distribution of the Palestinian People Worldwide. (Source: PASSIA)
This thesis aims to examine one of the key components of the overall conflict - the
perpetual, all encompassing dispossession of the Palestinian people and the resultant uneven
development between the two people who seek to lay claim to the land of Palestine. While much
has been written on specific spatio-temporal aspects of this seemingly unsolvable issue, I hope to
analyze some of the underlying processes, therein furthering our understanding of the overall
conflict. I will do this by viewing the conflict from a geopolitical angle, utilizing a dialectical
approach to knowledge and applying a theoretical framework that incorporates the geographical
concept of scalar fix into the theory of uneven development as defined by Harvey.3
The two specific objectives of the thesis are therefore defined as follows:
i.

To develop a conceptual framework that links scalar fix to Harvey's four key
conditionalities of uneven development, in particular the process of accumulation by
dispossession.

ii.

To investigate the use of scalar fix as a deliberate function of the socio-economic
dispossession of the Palestinian people.

3

Harvey, D. (2006). Spaces of Global Capitalism: Towards a Theory of Uneven Geographical Development. Verso:
New York.
.
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In the academic field of geography, the concept of scale reflects, generally speaking, the
geographical structure of social interaction in space, whereby space is not merely understood as
physical and absolute but moreover incorporates relational and social spatialities.4 Smith
describes the production and consolidation of scale - the scalar fix - as a way of geographically
organizing and expressing collective social action.5 In other words, scalar fix is by no means
accidental, but describes the premeditated setting of boundaries which provide the territorial
framework for political, economic and cultural processes within a society. It thus becomes a
powerful tool for dominant powers to steer these processes according to their own interests, and
to accumulate and consolidate financial and military power at the expense of weaker elements of
society. In that sense, the thesis argues that the concept of scalar fix is closely related to uneven
geographical development and what Harvey refers to as “capitalist imperialism”.6
The thesis is divided into 8 chapters. Chapter 2 addresses the study’s methodology dialectics - which is applied both to the theoretical framework and the following analysis of the
case of dispossessing the Palestinian people. The general overview of dialectics provided in the
second chapter is based on Ollman’s analysis of the way the dialectical method was used by
Marx to study capitalism as the dominant mode of production and social system. As the subject
of this study is in many ways a product of capitalist-imperialist aspirations, the use of the
dialectical approach is imperative, for according to Ollman, dialectics is “the only sensible way
to study a world composed of mutually dependent processes in constant evolution.”7

4

Ibid.
Smith, N. (1995). Remaking Scale: Competition and Cooperation in Pre-national and Post-national Europe. In
Heikki, Eskelinew, Folke and Snickars (Eds.) Competitive European Peripheries. (pp. 59-74). New York: Springer,
p.61.
6
Harvey, D. (2003). The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 26.
7
Ollman, B. (2003). Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx’s Method. Urbana/Chicago: University of Illinois Press,
p. 158.
.
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Chapter 3 lays out the theory which provides the conceptual framework for an analysis of
the uneven geographical development that defines the Palestine-Israeli conflict. The theoretical
approach draws on David Harvey’s thesis that uneven geographical development is primarily
achieved through the accumulation of capital by dispossession. It further utilizes the
geographical concepts of spatial and scalar fix, both of which are not applied only to absolute
space but are associated with the multiple spatialities defined by Harvey and Lefebvre. Finally, I
attempt to link these two components by arguing that scalar fix is used as an act of dispossession
leading to further uneven development.
Chapters 4 to 7 constitute the analysis part of this thesis, i.e. an examination of the usage
of various types of scalar fix as acts of dispossessing the Palestinian people of their political and
civil rights, livelihood, and identity. The themes of each chapter range from rather concrete
issues of policy making to more abstract ideologies of identity and difference. Chapter 4
examines the scalar fix of legislation and treaties which, in their function of consolidating the
power of Zionist rule in Palestine, have largely determined the course of events. In that sense,
chapter 4 provides a rough timeline of the Palestine-Israeli conflict. This is followed, in chapter
5, by an analysis of the effect of networking, which is closely interrelated with the adoption of
laws and treaties, for the networking relationships are oftentimes key in the formation of
legislation.
Chapter 6 investigates the use of scalar fix to control knowledge, which is understood as
an essential tool to organize and manipulate the spatial representation of the Palestinian people
and the Palestine-Israeli conflict overall. Taking into consideration the multiple channels
available for the production and dissemination of knowledge, this chapter includes the fields of
education, media, and public discourse and shows how they are utilized to dispossess

6
Palestinians not only of their physical means of livelihood, but also of the basic rights to define
themselves as Palestinian people. On a yet higher level of abstraction, chapter 7 examines the
scalar fix of identity and how the notion of different identities - constructed primarily through the
scalar fix described in chapter 6 - is utilized to claim superiority of one social structure over the
other, thus providing a legitimization for the dispossession of the Palestinians on the most
fundamental level.

CHAPTER 2: DIALECTICS AS METHODOLOGY
The application of dialectics as methodology in this thesis is grounded in the work by
Bertell Ollman, Dance of the Dialectic. Dialectics, as laid out by Ollman, is the Marxist method
used to study ongoing processes which cause changes within a social structure, by starting from
the system as a whole and breaking it down into individual components, or social factors.
Contrary to common methodology in social sciences, dialectical examination of these factors sets
out from a relational perspective. Thus, the main purpose of isolating a social factor is to draw
conclusions in relation to the entire system. In other words, social factors or units of a society are
not treated as independent or at best externally related, but are understood as internally related, in
a sense that the relation itself is seen as a significant part of each unit. These Relations8 are
defined by the processes and flows associated with them. Recognizing this interdependence of all
the parts making up the structure as a whole, dialectics takes “account of the changes and openendedness that constitute so large a part of social life.”9 Every factor is also internally related to
its past and future, as well as to past and future forms of other social relations. A book, for
instance, is contained in the pages that were used to bind it, as well as in the wood that was cut in

8
9

Ollman capitalized the word in order to distinguish from “relation” in the sense of “connection”.
Ollman, op. cit., p. 26.
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order to produce the paper in the first place. But the book is also all the thoughts, knowledge and
experiences that went into its writing, as well as the struggles with the publisher who insisted on
censoring critical parts of the story.
Rather than looking at concrete matter and the external relations of things, it is the flow
of internal processes of a given structure which dialectics seeks to examine in order to
understand how and why structural change occurs within a system. Focus is thus placed on the
historical transformation of the internal relations of social structures. This view also goes beyond
defining a commonly known causal relationship where one factor may be identified as cause and
others as conditions. Rather, “cause” and “condition” are internally related parts of each other.
Changes occur not simply because one factor changes, but rather it is the relation that changes,
thus - through its internal connectedness with everything else - directly or indirectly changing the
whole.
Marx identified four types of Relations: identity/difference, interpenetration of opposites,
quantity/quality, and contradiction. When conceptualizing things as Relations, a specific
phenomenon may appear identical in one sense, but convey a difference if studied at a more
detailed level. Although the Palestinian Arabs clearly share an identity as a nation, there are
different loyalties according to religion, class or belonging to a city or region. At larger scale,
there is an Arab identity spread through out the region of South-West Asia, yet differences are
evident between Egyptian and Syrian Arabs.
The interpenetration of opposites is based on the assumption that surrounding conditions
treated as internal relations determine the appearance and function of objects and the people who
perceive them.10 Ollman emphasizes the ‘perspectival element’ involved: While the separation
wall along the West Bank is considered by the Israeli government as a necessity to maintain
10

Ibid., p. 16.
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security, the barrier constitutes an essential threat to the livelihood of the Palestinian Arabs
whose farm land is confiscated and rendered useless due to the construction project. Although
these different perspectives do not imply equal truths they help us gain understanding in that they
present oppositional perspectives revealing the impact of a given situation.
The quantity/quality relation helps us understand how change occurs in looking at the
‘before and after’ aspects of the development of a situation. A distinction between quantity and
quality shows that change may become apparent only after taking a qualitative form, yet one
must be aware that - quantitatively - this change may come about at a much earlier stage.
Therefore, the underlying processes must be looked for in both qualitative manifestation, but also
the preceding mechanisms as causal factors for change. The build-up of Jewish settlements starts
out as a quantitative change with few housing arrangements scattered seemingly arbitrarily
throughout the country. It is the increasing number of settlements over time which eventually
leads to the qualitative creation of ‘facts on the ground’ designed to legitimize the Jewish state of
Israel.
The most significant relation identified by Marx is contradiction, which Ollman defined
as the “incompatible development of different elements within the same relation [...] between
elements that are also dependent on one another.” The differences between these elements are
based on certain conditions which are constantly changing, thus generating a transformation in
the differential elements themselves. To the extent that each element is part of a whole, one
change in a condition will affect the entire structure. It is hence the focus on the contradictions
within a Relation that allows us to recognize how change is produced and how it might affect
development in the future. There is a great contradiction, for example, between Israel’s official

9
quest for ‘peace and security’ with its Arab neighbors and its simultaneous expansion of Jewish
settlements in the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights.
In his dialectical approach of breaking up the whole into interrelated parts, Marx utilized
three levels of abstraction: extension, level of generality and vantage point. Operating in these
different modes provides three different kinds of focus on the important aspects of a certain
phenomenon we wish to study.11 Extension refers to the spatial and temporal boundaries set for
the structure which is to be abstracted. This allows the analysis of a specific problem to be
carried out not only within a certain historical time frame but also a defined spatial territory.
Thus, in order to study the Israel/Palestine conflict, our temporal extension reaches back to the
creation of the Zionist movement in the 1880s, while the main spatial focus is set on the
contested land of Palestine. These boundaries, however, are not fixed but rather dialectically
manipulated, in order to identify the true extent of a relation. In the case of Palestine this requires
a spatial extension to include the neighboring Arab states as well as the British and US powers
and investigate their role in shaping Palestinian space.
The abstraction of extension is related to the second mode of abstraction, the level of
generality. This involves the move of viewing a relation in its narrower, concrete sense toward a
more general, more abstract understanding: from the individual level to that of human society as
a whole. The closer one stays to the concrete world, the lower the level of abstraction. When
abstracting the economic situation of Palestinian Arabs, we find at a lower level the concrete
situation of the individual Palestinian who is forced to work for Israeli construction companies,
building Jewish settlements in place of where his own house was torn down after Israeli
legislation having rendered it illegal. At a higher level we may look at the Arab labor force in
general, which is exploited by Israeli capitalists. Ollman points out that, in order to study a
11

Ibid., p. 175.
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particular Relation, it is essential to choose that level of generality which highlights the
characteristics responsible for shaping a problem.12 If we want to explain foreign support for the
Zionist movement, it is necessary to focus on a more concrete level of the individual to analyze
and evaluate the role of personalities such as Lord Rothschild. At the same time, we must
consider Zionism as a whole on a more general level in order to understand the entirety of its
impact on Palestinian space.
The third mode of abstraction is the vantage point, which is established in
correspondence to the abstraction of extension and level of generality at which a given problem
is studied. As researchers face the risk to study a phenomenon under the influence of their own
perspective (or that handed down by their own culture), the focus on a specific level of
generality, at a given spatio-temporal extension, allows identifying the precise angle from which
the problem should be investigated.
Using the dialectical method of abstracting a given situation from the concrete allows us
to study phenomena as complex as the Palestine-Israeli conflict. As all objects and events are
treated as internally related, dialectics will help identify the contradictions and tensions which
cause social contest and thus bring about change. The three modes of abstraction further aid in
setting the correct focus on the causal relations and thus lead us to an understanding of the
outcomes of social struggle.
Through its method of abstracting those patterns of a given system most associated with
interaction and change, dialectics has the potential to draw conclusions necessary to recognize
the bigger picture which is often lost in analysis of a social problem studied in isolation. As
Ollman pointed out, dialectics attempts to study “those who steal the commons from under the

12

Ibid., p. 90.
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goose” rather than focusing on “the people who steal a goose from off the commons.”13 While
this approach is essential to any study of capitalist-imperial forces and uneven development, it is
particularly suited for an analysis of the Palestine-Israeli conflict.
Previous works in geography show that dialectics is not only used conceptually, but can
also be applied to a concrete situation. Using dialectics, Merrifield’s ‘reconciliation’ of
Lefebvre’s “Place and Space” offers a conceptualization of the capitalist space-place
relationship. Merrifield then applies his interpretation of the politics of space to the case of
“Redeveloping American Can in Southeast Baltimore”. Similarly, I will use dialectics to pursue
my two specific objectives: to further develop the concept of scalar fix and to gain understanding
of the development of Palestine as a case in the concrete world. While data for the dialectical
method may be obtained from both primary and secondary sources, my research will focus on
secondary sources including written material and research done by others, statistical and census
data.

13

Ibid., p. 155.
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CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction
For a fruitful analysis of the function of accumulation processes as a key ingredient of
uneven geographical development, and its linkage to processes of everyday life and the perpetual
social struggle to resist dominant forces, we need to understand various geopolitical concepts.
The first section of this chapter addresses the role of imperialism, first in form of the British
Empire and later under US hegemony, and its connection to uneven geographical development
and its individual components.
The second part defines the multiple concepts of space and how they will be used for
dialectical analysis. By encompassing multiple spatialities as described by Harvey,14 I hope to
identify and focus on those underlying processes and internal socio-spatial relations which may
help analyze and understand the social phenomena and struggles we encounter in everyday life,
and which constitute potential agents of change. It is hence important to recognize space not
merely as extant in the physical realm, but as a social construct tightly interwoven with the mode
of production as well as other social relations. This focus on social space is insofar essential, as it
is in this realm “where the dominant relations of production are reproduced.”15 As the processes
of the capitalist mode of production are part of our everyday, social life, they play a significant
role in shaping and structuring the spatial environment. Thus in order to understand this impact
on space, we have to look at the system as a whole while singling out the relevant individual
relations.

14
15

Harvey, Uneven Development, op. cit.
Soja, E. (1980). The socio-spatial dialectic. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 70 (2), p. 213.
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The spatial fix, first identified by Harvey is a key concept in understanding how capital is
accumulated, and, more importantly, how accumulation crises evolve and affect the geographical
space. In the third part of this chapter I will take a short step from the spatial fix towards the
concepts of scale and scalar fix, which, I argue, may be linked to the processes of capital
accumulation, in particular through devaluation and dispossession. As the impact of these
accumulation processes spans over a variety of social spatialities beyond the world of the
concrete, the scalar fix should be applied to these multiple spatialities.

3.1 Imperialism and Uneven Development
In tackling the social impact of capitalism from a geographical perspective, we need to
look at the expansionary policies of imperialism and the resultant spread of uneven development.
Yet, in order to enable a meaningful analysis, it is imperative to have a clear understanding of the
meaning of these terms. Imperialism is, broadly defined, “an extension or imposition of the
power, authority or influence of a state over other states, or stateless communities.”16 In this
sense, imperialism has been extant for a long time. The rise of capitalism as the dominant mode
of production, however, formed a new type of ‘capitalist imperialism.’17
Under the expansion of capitalist imperialism we recognize two forces at work: the
‘territorial’ and ‘capitalist’ logics of power.18 The territorial logic refers to the diplomatic and,
more significantly, the military means of a state to exercise and expand its power. On the
contrary, the capitalist logic constitutes the flows of economic power “across and through
continuous space … through the daily practices of production, trade, commerce, capital flows,

16

Arrighi, G. (2005, March/April). Hegemony Unravelling -1. New Left Review, 32, p. 27.
Harvey, New Imperialism, op. cit., p. 26.
18
See both Arrighi and Harvey.
17
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money transfers…”19 Harvey emphasizes that the relation between these two inherently distinct
logics of power is not always straightforward, but rather complex and contradictory in a
dialectical sense.20 Hence, in order to analyze imperialist moves, it is necessary to look at the
interrelation of these two components, as both have been used throughout the historical
geography of capitalism and the pursuit and accumulation of power.
Whereas the capitalist-imperialist expansion was, at its outset, dominated by city states
such as Venice, Genoa and Amsterdam, they were eventually replaced by territorial states, the
latter being more powerful key players. From the formation and consolidation process of nationstates which took place in Europe throughout the 18th and 19th century, the United Kingdom
emerged as the key player. Under the pretense of acting in the general interest of the newly
consolidated ‘Concert of Europe’, the British Empire established unprecedented world power.21
Under the cloak of being the beneficiary Britain’s imperial strife for power was acted out
in the open, consolidating British authority and influence over major parts of the world. The
contrary has been the case with its successor, the United States, the hegemony of which deserves
some more detailed attention. Since the beginning of its domination with the end of WWII,
America has hidden its imperial ambitions under a rhetoric designed to divert from numerous
involvements in foreign affairs. Yet an interventionist foreign policy has materialized using both
the capitalist as well as the territorial logic of power. Rather than talking of an American
‘Empire’ the focus has been placed on the emergence of the ‘American Century’, thus drawing
off the attention from expansionist efforts and implying that it is America’s ‘turn’ of world
leadership. For the past six decades, America has exercised its influence through actions of a
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rather covert and subtle nature, ranging from CIA aided forced regime changes in geopolitically
significant countries, to taking leadership of supranational governmental organizations such as
the UN, World Bank and IMF.22
A significant change in policy was taken in the 1970s, when the U.S. leadership started to
follow a neo-liberal paradigm which emphasized finance capital over productive activity.
Domestically, the privatization of sectors beneficial to the whole society, such as transportation
and electricity, took place at the expense of the individual’s rights. On the global level, capital
investment in the underdeveloped world - guided and aided by the World Bank’s structural
adjustment programs - forced developing countries to design their governmental and financial
structure in accordance with the capitalist system of the ‘advanced’ world.23 In this sense, it is
important to recognize the role played by development policies, assistance programs and aid as
part of an imperialist global outreach. This way of promoting the neo-liberal economic model
has been coined as ‘financial low intensity warfare’.24 Even within the Westernized area, the
U.S. manifested its influence through huge investments in the economies of Japan and Europe,
particularly Germany. Apart from an increasing monopolization of capital, the economy became
ever more fictitious, being based primarily on speculations on assets and debts without the
necessary back-up through production, which was outsourced to cheaper sites in developing
areas in order to encourage American mass consumption.
Under the second Bush administration, the increasing fragility of the global finance
system has caused a shift towards a more coercive, neo-conservative form of US hegemony. At
the turn of the century, a rather influential think tank was established proposing geopolitical
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strategies based on the notion of the ‘American Century’ - destined to take leadership in bringing
freedom and democracy to the rest of the world. The Project for the New American Century
(PNAC), sponsored and supported by hawkish politicians such as Wolfowitz, Cheney and
Rumsfeld, advocated a unilateral US foreign policy and a significant increase in defense
spending in order to “challenge regimes hostile to [their] interests and values”, thus shifting the
focus toward the territorial logic of power.25
At all times, this growing expansion of hegemonic influence and dominance throughout
the world has been accompanied by differential socio-economic development between those
regions constituting the source of power and those that have fallen under the authority of the
dominant forces. The result is visible in today’s ‘civilized’, globalized world, where
industrialized societies are highly dependent on cheap material resources and exploitative labor
practices in underdeveloped countries. Despite efforts to reduce hunger and poverty through
‘free trade’ agreements, open markets and neo-liberal strategies, the uneven distribution of
wealth remains an issue on the regional as well as global level.
The fact that uneven development is ever present hints at the complexity of the issue at
hand. Whereas a variety of approaches toward an understanding of uneven development has been
attempted over the years, it seems in fact nearly impossible to ascribe one specific theory capable
of explaining the phenomenon in its entirety. In his latest contribution to further develop the
theory of uneven geographical development, Harvey has identified four “key conditionalities” of
uneven development:
1) The material embedding of capital accumulation processes in the web of socio-ecological life.
2) Accumulation by dispossession.
3) Accumulation in space and time.
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4) Political, social and “class” struggles at a variety of geographical scales.

The following review of these components will show their interrelation with the elements of
capitalist imperialism discussed above.
The capitalist mode of production entails the commodification of basically all aspects of
life, including private property, labor power and skills, cultural traits and local customs of an
area. To the extent that processes of capital accumulation are grounded in our everyday life, we
are directly affected by the positive and negative outcomes thereof. While we may benefit from
investment in new infrastructure and housing, we are disadvantaged by the relocation of
production facilities resultant in the mass layoff of workers. The building of a new power plant
might create employment opportunities, but destroys the natural environment to an immeasurable
extent. All outcomes are part of the way capital accumulation processes are embedded into the
social structure of our daily routine. Harvey emphasizes that the question of how such processes
are manifested in and how they transform social relations is crucial for a theoretical framework.
With the formation of dominant class powers at the base of the capitalist system, a major
process of uneven development is the accumulation/devaluation of capital through dispossession.
The capitalist mode of production entails not only the strife for generating surplus values; it is
primarily a matter of how to control and appropriate those surpluses and the means to produce
them. This requires the dominant capitalist class to take advantage of weaker elements of society
and dispossess them of the use values (land, labor, raw materials) necessary for capital
accumulation. Dispossession takes place in various forms within, or in expansion of, a capitalist
system. As has been seen in early mercantilist, colonial, imperial and later neo-colonial practices,
coercive forces may be used to penetrate non-capitalist societies and geographical terrain to
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utilize the resources of that power, often played out under the disguise of development policy.26
A major part of the British imperial expansion to South and Southwest Asia was conducted on
the premises that the forcefully occupied territories were highly underdeveloped and backwards,
thus in need of British trusteeship and investment. In addition, dispossession may occur within a
capitalist system itself, where factional class powers seek to acquire or destroy assets of rivals
(finance capital seizes assets of farmers, stripping assets through mergers and acquisitions).
How do these processes of capital accumulation occur through space and time?
Competition within and between capitalist markets entails not only the geographical division of
labor; competitive advantage can also be achieved by capitalists occupying superior terrain and
neglecting less valuable land. Once a territory’s potential for generating surplus is recognized,
investments are made and capital is fixed in form of physical infrastructure for production and
consumption. The profitability within a given region, however, is generally restricted, thus
forcing a continuous expansion of capitalist powers. As surpluses of capital and labor can no
longer be absorbed in the existing infrastructure, capitalists are in need of a ‘spatial fix’ provided
by new investment opportunities either locally or abroad. These opportunities are seized - or, if
necessary, created - through the capital and territorial logics of power. At a local or regional
scale, devalued assets are released at very low cost and can be seized by the over-accumulated
capital for profitable use.27 If liberal economic practices of privatization prove to be an
insufficient means to this end, dominant powers tend to utilize coercive forces as seen in colonial
and imperial practices. Once the domestic market is exhausted, a spatial expansion of capitalist
means is inevitable.
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It is little surprising that the encroachment of capitalism is met with resistance by those
elements of a society that fall victim to the dispossession process. While the most obvious
struggles occur over land, living space and natural resources such resistance is often interwoven
with struggles over ethnic or religious identity, as seen in the long-standing conflict between
Israel and Palestine.28 Harvey points out that, while the occurrence of social contest is rather
apparent, the challenge lies in unraveling the complexity of the inner connections between such
struggles and the overall process of capital accumulation.
In light of the expansive and oppressive nature of the capitalist mode of production,
uneven development is understood as the ‘essence of capitalism’. Indeed, it may be argued that
the capitalist system functions primarily upon the existence and utilization of differential spatial
development. In agreement with Smith and Harvey, Soja argued that the capitalist mode of
production has been established and expanded through the “distinctive occupation and
production of space … the differentiation of centers and peripheries, and the penetration of the
state into everyday life.”29 This phenomenon of uneven geographical development is intrinsically
linked to capitalist imperialism. As Soja concludes: “the capitalist mode of production actively
creates, intensifies, and seeks to maintain regional or, more broadly, spatial inequalities as a
means for its own survival.”30 Here, once again, the socio-spatial homology becomes apparent,
whereby “core and periphery are the spatial expressions of the same underlying relations of
production which define bourgeoisie and proletariat.”31 Just as the vertical, social axis is defined
through the exploitative relationship between the dominant classes and labor, we find on the
spatial axis, that the peripheral areas are not only dependent on but exploited by the core
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countries, whose growth and enrichment is based on the utilization of resources from the lesser
developed world without returning the due costs in a socio-economically just manner. Similarly,
the division and unevenness between industrial and agricultural areas is as much a social
phenomenon as it is spatial. We must hence conclude that the spatial environment cannot be
isolated from the social structure, but rather a given system is to be understood as socio-spatial,
with internal and external forces affecting both the spatial and the social component.

3.2 The Multiplicity of Space
In order to analyze the complexity of the socio-spatial processes of uneven development,
it is imperative to conceptualize space beyond the colorless container of the absolute; as the
space of capitalism is socially produced to the extent that the organization, use and meaning of
space are a product of social activities.32 We thus have to understand space as dialectically
interrelated and intertwined with the social relations of production. Soja recognized that the
structure of organized space is thus part of the general relations of capitalist production.33 As the
dominant relations of production are reproduced in social space, space is occupied by advanced
finance capitalism, centralizing control and eventually leading to an increasing unevenness in
geographical development.
In an attempt to conceptually broaden our understanding of space, Harvey has argued
that, rather than merely defining “what is space”, we should consider “how different human
practices create and make use of different conceptualizations of space.” As early as 1973, he
noted that
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[i]f we regard space as absolute it becomes a ‘thing in itself’ with an existence independent of
matter. It then possesses a structure which we can use to pigeon-hole or individuate phenomena. The
view of relative space proposes that it be understood as a relationship between objects which exists
only because objects exist and relate to each other. There is another sense in which space can be
viewed as relative and I choose to call this relational space – space regarded […] as being contained
in objects in the sense that an object can be said to exist only insofar as it contains and represents
within itself relationships to other objects.34

The realm of the absolute is - as the term suggests - the primary space of the discrete and
tangible, of territorially bounded objects of varying size: from the body to a household to city or
state. For that reason, the notion of absolute space is rather limited in analytical power. On the
other hand, relative space takes into consideration the perspective of a given space, its features in
relation to other realms. Locations are thus understood and evaluated relative to a central place,
its distance in terms of time, cost or energy. The local hospital might be of great significance
relative to the city and surrounding villages; its importance declines, however, for people living
hundreds of miles away. Space is also relative in terms of time, particularly when we think about
the friction of distance - as expressed both in Tobler’s Law and location theory - and its impact
on transportation. This takes an entirely new stand given the annihilation of space through time
in the era of globalization and advanced capitalism. There are, however, limits to the positivist
paradigm which looks at space from the absolute and relative perspective. The dialectical
approach allows us then to go beyond these restrictions by taking into account the relational
aspect of space, i.e. the notion that everything exists only as an internal relation with everything
else. In other words, a subject or object is defined not only through its mere physical existence,
but through its relationships with its spatial and temporal environment. It is the significance of
these relations that gives meaning to things and their existence in space.
34
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Harvey emphasizes that, rather than bringing the three concepts into a fixed hierarchical
order, the key to successful analysis is the interconnectedness of all three. Yet, he acknowledges
that a hierarchy exists to some extent, as absolute space is embraced by the relative, and both are
contained in relational space. In other words, an event can happen in absolute space, while at the
same time it has a relative and relational, spatio-temporal component to it.35
In an attempt to visualize this interconnectedness and the impact thereof, Harvey has
proposed a spatial matrix (see figure 2), which places these conceptual notions of absolute,
relative and relational space on a vertical axis put up against the horizontal, comprised of a
tripartite division of space proposed by Lefebvre: experienced, conceived and lived space. The
first of Lefebvre’s categories, i.e. experienced space, entails the tangible, material world as we
experience it with our senses, whereas the second category, i.e. conceived space, refers to how
space is represented in an abstract way, based on our understanding and reflection of the material
world. These representations of space include maps, graphs, and literal accounts, but also artistic
expressions such as poetry, pictures or architecture. The representation expressed through art
often reflects spaces of the third category, i.e. lived space: our emotions, fears, imaginations and
the extent to which these psychologies impact the way we experience and interact with our
environment.36
While this theoretical division of space according to Lefebvre assists us in the process of
conceptualization and abstraction, the key is, once again, to understand the dialectical relation
between the three categories. Our physical experience of the world is often influenced by our
preconceptions, our knowledge and experience, as well as ideological and moral settings. Thus
the spaces of representation, i.e. the lived space, are partially responsible for what happens in the
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material world and our conception thereof. At the same time, our fears and emotions influence
the way we represent space and spatial relations. A migrant might thus have an entirely different
experience of a given space, say, the capital of a developed country where he seeks asylum, than
the native who spent all his life there. Places in the new environment may remind the immigrant
of wartime experiences from home; and thus take on a meaning which the native does not share.
If both were to draw a picture of the same city, we are likely to get two rather different results.37
Reversely, a tourist from the developed world traveling to ‘exotic’ places in the Caribbean is
unlikely to experience the poverty and hardship which comprise the material world of the locals,
but rather take home romantic memories from lonely beaches and sunsets. The same
phenomenon is true when moving beyond the individual level. In the US, Hawaii is considered
an almost integral part of America. Yet, its native inhabitants, if asked about their social and
national affiliations, consider themselves as Hawaiian, not Americans. Many of them take, in
fact, a rather hostile attitude towards the US, remembering the dispossession of their land and
resources which is not to be found in American history books.38
Finally, when looking at the spatial matrix as a whole, it is the intersection points of the
matrix which are of interest to our analysis. The crossing points maintained by the Israelis in the
West Bank and Gaza manifest themselves both in absolute and experienced space, in a sense that
they are part of the built environment. Yet, the frustration Palestinians feel having to wait for
hours to pass one of those checkpoints is directly associated with lived as well as relative space.
In other words, it occurs at the intersection of the two in the matrix. In that sense, the focus on
the points of intersection also helps us to analyze and abstract particular social factors, or
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Relations, as they occur within the multiple spaces and the scalar fixes associated with them.
This will be addressed in the remaining two sections of this chapter.

Figure 2: General matrix of spatialities. (Source: Harvey, Uneven Development).

3.3 The Concept of Scalar Fix
While bearing in mind the interconnectedness of the four conditionalities of uneven
development, the focus in this analysis will be placed on the process of accumulation through
dispossession. How can we understand its internal relations with the help of geographical
concepts? In this chapter I argue that the act of dispossession takes place through the means of
‘scaling’ spaces - and thus shaping and manipulating them - to the advantage of a dominant
power.
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Geographers studying the concept of scale agree that its construction is based on social
processes. Put differently, scale reflects the geographical structure of social interaction in
space.39 Moreover, it is through the production - and fixing - of scale that space is structured and
places are shaped. Smith defined the production of scale broadly as a “means of geographically
organizing and expressing collective social action”, therein providing a “platform and container
for certain social activities.”40 By extension, the scalar fix is conceptualized as a territorial
organization of the corresponding socio-spatial processes, in other words, the bounding of
political, economic and cultural activity. This involves first and foremost the steering of capital
flows as well as the shaping of power relationships within and between states, including
networking activities among cultural groups and ethnic, racial or religious identities. The most
apparent way in which these processes present themselves is through the establishment of
boundaries, formalized as nation-states or supranational regional organizations, or more
informally through regions within a state.41
Research in geography has almost exclusively applied these concepts to the process of
territorial organization as it occurs in the realm of absolute space, emphasizing therein a
hierarchy of scales from local to regional, to national and global. The key role is hereby ascribed
to the scalar fix of the nation-state and what Lefebvre termed the “state mode of production”.
According to Brenner, the state serves “both as a form of territorialization for capital and as an
institutional mediator of uneven development in differential spatial scales.”42 Its determinate
boundaries, well established institutions and set structures provide the ultimate scaffolding for
39
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the social relations of capitalism and thus enable the “mobility” and “transcience” of labor
power, commodities and capital.43 It is the state’s rigidity - or fixation - which provides a secured
platform for capitalist growth, as it facilitates and controls the process of increasing
centralization and concentration of capital, either in urban centers or by multinational companies.
In doing so, it utilizes and manipulates multi-scalar structures within and beyond the state,
funneling capital flows to urban, regional and global scales. The extent to which the state plays a
role in the accumulation of capital, however, varies from case to case, with socialist democracies
taking a more protectionist approach than liberal economies.44
While the state provides the legal framework, financial accumulation processes and
decision-making with regards to production and reproduction take place at another scale: the
metropolitan areas and urban centers. These control points within the world of capital flows are
connected and interdependent on a global level, the magnitude of which has become, more than
ever, evident in the current financial crisis. Thus, while a distinctive hierarchy of the various
fixed scales is extant, they are nevertheless coalescent in their function of interplay of fixity and
motion.
It is important to note that, despite their rigidity, scalar fixes must display a flexibility
which corresponds to the changing needs of the capitalist system. The function and structure of
the state are thus altered over time as necessary adjustments to socio-economic processes are
made. During the neo-liberal era initiated in the US during the 1980s, the role of the state was
brought to a minimum, whereas now it exercises much more influence in response to the most
recent accumulation crisis and the concomitant bankruptcy of financial institutions.
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The role of the state is also under constant change in relation to other scales. Thus we
have seen a change in the role of the European nation-state as a scalar fix in the era of the EU.
Re-structurations of scale-configurations at state level occur in times of accumulation crises, as
can be seen in the reaction to the contemporary financial crisis, where we in fact see the state
taking once again a stronger place in the capital system.
To the extent that the use of the concept of scale pertaining to the territorial organization
of space has a significant impact on the social environment, it is associated with the social spaces
described in Harvey’s matrix. Swyngedouw, for instance, argued that scales are the
“embodiment and expression of power relationships” and thus provide an arena of control and
domination where social relations of (dis-)empowerment operate.45 In that sense, Swyngedouw
shows how scale also becomes part of resistance as opponent groups utilize the very existing
scalar structures designed oppress to rise against the dominant power. Similarly, Smith
emphasizes that one aspect of scale is the political potential (and its translation into resistance
movements) inherent in the production of scale.46
Scale is hence also conceptualized as a “resolution or abstraction employed for
understanding social relationships” and may thus refer to socially drawn boundaries of difference
and sameness. By marking a clear distinction of the ‘other’, scale is closely intertwined with
notions of identity, which may be expressed - and exploited - through features such as race,
gender, ethnicity or religion.47
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In setting the focus on the underlying social processes as they occur in space, I seek to
apply the scalar concept not only to the absolute spaces of the city, state and region, but rather
think it useful - for the purpose of this analysis - to expand the concept to the multiplicity of
spaces as proposed by Harvey. Just as the notion of space is much more complex than the
‘container’ of absolute space, so should the idea of scale be taken as a multi-faceted concept.
Several researchers in the field have already hinted towards such an application. Howitt, for
instance, emphasized that “if social relations are always spatial…, then social and environmental
relations are also always scaled.”48 Moreover, as Brenner has pointed out in his eleven
hypotheses pertaining the further study of scalar fix, “an analysis of the spatiality of scale is
required in order to excavate [the] full sociospatial content” of sociospatial practices.49 It is thus
essential to conceive scale not merely as a measure of size or level, but rather as a relation in
itself.50 As an abstraction comprising the dialectical elements of ‘extension’, ‘level of generality’
and ‘vantage point’, scale encompasses facets of time, culture, ethnicity and environment in a
spatial setting that incorporates the lived and conceived space.

3.4 The Scalar Fixes of Multiple Spaces
The following section will introduce several scalar fixes as they occur in the various
spaces, particularly the relational, perceived and lived space as well as the junctions thereof. To
understand the origin of the practice of scaling spaces, it is helpful to begin with a review of the
concept of spatial fix. As capital absorption within an existing structure reaches its limit, the
system with its built environment and financial assets is threatened by loss and devaluation. One
solution - or fix - to this problem is the expansion of capital towards new spaces, e.g. through the
48
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incorporation of non- or pre-capitalist societies into the system. These new spaces need
development in form of physical and social infrastructure and thus have a large potential to
absorb surplus capital. From a long-term perspective, however, these spatial fixes are both
spatially and temporally limited. Once all spatial barriers to capitalist flows are eliminated and
the capitalist outreach is exhausted, existing structures need to be re-modeled in order to soak up
excess capital and to satisfy - at least temporally - the immense hunger for profits.51 As Harvey
points out:
the aggregate effect is… that capitalism perpetually seeks to create a geographical landscape to
facilitate its activities at one point in time only to have to destroy it and build a whole different
landscape at a later point in time to accommodate its perpetual thirst for endless capital
accumulation.

There is no doubt that this spatial fix through the investment of excess capital in the built
environment has a significant impact on the social structure of the targeted system. Thus, a
secure inflow of capital into the newly opened-up spaces requires an ideological justification that
wins not only domestic support of the expansive measures, but also a welcoming embrace, or at
least acceptance, from the society upon which the newly constructed roads, factories, school and,
hospitals are bestowed. This is accomplished through the mobilization of “nationalism, jingoism,
patriotism and, above all, racism” but also the ‘development doctrine’ that portrays the
industrialized world (or, in former days, the colonial powers) as benefactor for the developing
countries. In that sense, the spatial fix expands beyond the physical space as legitimizing
ideologies are expressed - or fixed - in the realm of the conceived space, addressing the fears and
emotions of the lived space.
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How is this manipulation of space accomplished? What is the necessary socio-political
framework, and what institutions need to be in place in order to facilitate capital flows within
and throughout space and to secure a spatial fix of capital at times of accumulation crises? The
incorporation of new spaces as well as the destruction and reconstruction of existing spaces
entail – in one way or another - almost always various acts of dispossession. The feasibility of
this process requires the appropriate institutions as well as an adequate power structure to control
both geographical space and social environment.
To explain how this is secured, I will apply the concept of scalar fix to the multiple
spaces of Harvey’s matrix. While the scope of this thesis limits the discussion to a select few
forms of scalar fix, it is important to note that all intersections in the spatial matrix potentially
have a scalar fix associated with them. Moreover, a socio-spatial phenomenon may be affected
by more than one scalar fix, as it expands over several spatial realms. The scalar fixes are thus
interrelated in their impact on social space.
The remainder of this section introduces four types of scalar fix in their function of
consolidating power, which will be applied to the situation of the Palestinian people in the
following four chapters. The first way of scalar configuration is the passing of legislation and
treaties which legitimize acts of dispossession that in return facilitate the expansion of capital. In
his study of dispossessing indigenous people in Australia, Howitt found that a major component
of dispossession has been the “construction of specific scales of social control” which facilitated
the disciplining of indigenous people through banishing targeted groups from certain structures
and institutions, or simply dishonoring existing treaties designed to grant certain rights. On a
broader note, the issue of ‘unequal treaties’ has been a major, power-consolidating tool in the
colonial - and arguably the post-colonial - era. The colonial powers of Europe designed trading
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agreements and treaties much to the disadvantage of the populations of the colonies. This type of
scale politics also works in a negative way: by creating an “imaginary of absence”, extant
spatialities and scalar frames of the indigenous’ social relations are either denied or erased, thus
depriving the indigenous people of their mere existence.52 As will be shown in chapter 4, a
similar act of dispossession has happened to the Palestinian people, whose rights to land,
resources and development have been denied since the beginning of Jewish domination in
Palestine.
While these treaties are a form of consolidating power visible in open space, they are
often facilitated through the establishment of networks in the background, and the cooperation of
a group of people in pursuit of equal interests or a common objective. While networking is
generally understood to be a spatial concept on its own, I argue that networks may function as a
scalar fix in itself. The dominant elite that emanates from networking relations may use their
power to the disadvantage of weaker elements of society. An analysis of Israel’s coming to
power, at the expense of an entire indigenous people, can only by fruitful if various networks and
their flows of information, knowledge and finance across state boundaries are given their due
consideration. This includes a wide range of networks from the cooperation of early Zionists
with members of the powerful banking house of Rothschild a century ago, to the networking
between the pro-Israeli think tanks and the US administration.
On a more abstract level, dispossession is aided through the scaling of gathering and
disseminating of knowledge, for the things we learn and come to accept as truth are shaped and
controlled in various ways. First, with respect to the information available to the general
population, the media plays a crucial role in representing certain socio-spatial developments.
While accusations of bias have long been made by critics of mainstream journalism, the majority
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of people still assume the media to provide us with objective information. Thus, unaware of that
portion of information which is either under-reported or outright ignored, we tend to accept the
news reporting - as selective as it may be - as the general truth. The global mass media of film,
television, and the internet affects and shapes our imagination of political, economical and social
events. The media thus becomes a powerful tool to directly manipulate our conceived space, and
indirectly our lived and the experienced space. Through their direct control over how we
comprehend and envision the world we live in, the media may shape people’s imagination and
stoke fears of the unknown, of perceived threats.
Censorship in the media is particularly apparent in the reporting on the US’ conduct in
the current ‘War on Terrorism’. Reports about torture used by US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq
were hardly covered by the US corporate media.53 That is, if they were taken up at all by the
Associated Press (AP), the self-acclaimed “backbone of the world’s information system.” On
their own website, the AP prides itself to be the “essential global news network, providing
distinctive news services of the highest quality, reliability and objectivity with reports that are
accurate, balanced and informed.” Yet, a clear bias in the AP can be seen in several instances,
among them the movement to impeach then President George W. Bush initiated in 2005. While
the AP did report on sporadic calls for impeachment on local and state level in a variety of states,
it failed to assess the issue to be of national significance, ignoring polls in late 2005 which
showed that a majority of Americans were in favor of impeaching Bush and making it look as if
the national movement of impeachment did not exist.54 A strong bias, on part of AP as well as
the corporate media, is also evident in the reporting on the Palestine-Israel conflict. It is no secret
that a large portion of the media is owned and thus controlled by Jews, many of whom are

53
54

Phillips, P. et al. A Study of Bias in the Associated Press. Project Censored.
Ibid.

33
outspoken Zionists. Moreover, the printing press has been pressured by the Israeli lobby to report
in favor of Israel and to avoid any major criticism.
The power and influence of the media on public opinion further helps construct scales of
discourse and terminology that play a key role in processes of uneven development, and acts of
dispossession in particular. Once certain concepts and ideas about a specific event, a population
or social structure take on a fixed shape, they acquire the status of truth, whether justified or not.
In accordance with the interest of a dominant power, certain parts of populations are labeled as
enemies of the state who threaten state security and thus justify action against them as necessary
acts to protect the population. In the aftermath of WWII, McCarthyism propagated a ‘Red Scare’
creating an artificial threat of communism which led to the persecution, interrogation and even
imprisonment of numerous Americans. In contemporary times, the most prominent example is
found in the notion of ‘terrorism’ and the ‘war on terror’. These and other numerous
misrepresentations remind us of Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-four ‘lexicon of opposites’.55 The
invaders and destroyers are supposedly bringing ‘democracy and freedom’, while those who dare
resist the invasion and oppression are the ‘terrorists’. While it portrays itself as the innocent
victim, the US has in fact fomented terrorism through its imperialist foreign policy over the
years. A similar statement can be made about the Israelis, who claim to be the victims of terrorist
acts after having evicted hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their lands and homes.
A significant influence on knowledge is also taken in the more exclusive circles of
academics. The scalar power play is here exercised through the surveillance of academic writings
and teachings, as well as the check on careers of those who are not in line with mainstream
policies. A professor whose lectures and writings do not comply with ideas of the ruling class
may be denied a promotion. A course whose content is thought to go against what is desired to
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be spread as knowledge by dominant powers might be taken off the catalog due to pressure from
certain power groups. The content of textbooks is often hotly debated, especially with regards to
accounts of history. The discourse over what is considered “legitimate knowledge” is defined by
“complex power relations and struggles among identifiable class, race, gender/sex, and religious
groups.”56
Even more importantly, the writing of history has been (mis-)used throughout the
centuries to scale people’s perception of their environment in its spatio-temporal context. As has
been noted, “histories of struggles are most often written by the victors.”57 Little is mentioned in
US history books of the brutal fate of the millions of African slaves who died during the
transport from Africa to America. The same is true for the millions of Germans who had to face
a brutal death under the advance of the Russians at the end of WWII. In both cases, the actual
events are hardly acknowledged, let alone commemorated. As regards the story of Palestine, the
Israeli historian Ilan Pappe introduced the idea of ‘memoricide’, the ultimate scalar fix
dispossessing the Palestinians of their history, culture and identity while ascribing a history to
the Jews which is primarily based on falsehood, but favors the Zionist cause.58
All these tools or means of dispossession within the field of public discourse evolve
around one issue: the production and utilization of ‘identity’. As research in social studies has
shown, the manufacturing of an identity can be an extremely powerful tool, as it differentiates
between two social structures or groups in a sense that renders one superior to the other, which in
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our case translates to the Zionist Jews’ conceived superiority over the Palestinians. As Edward
Said concluded:
… the triumph of identity by one culture or state almost always is implicated directly or indirectly in the
denial, or the suppression of equal identity for other groups, states, or cultures.59

Scalar fixes established within their historical-geographical contexts present a powerful
tool determining and restraining a future development of scales. Hence, while the focus lies on
the scalar frame of accumulation by dispossession, consideration will also be given to social
struggle, which is often the result of acts of dispossession. There is, in fact a mutual dependence
between these two components of uneven development, for oppressive regimes generally adjust
their control mechanisms to the forms of resistance movements, which evolve as a response to
oppression in the first place. Resistance against extant socio-spatial arrangements is thus
confined within existing structures, i.e. scalar fixes. While this is certainly true for the scalar
hierarchy of the ‘absolute’, the idea carries even greater significance if we think along lines of
spatial representations and representations of space. Once a certain identity is constructed, the
major challenge of social struggle lies in breaking down that identity. I shall thus argue that the
Zionist identity has served as a scalar fix in the realm of the relational and representative which
has been essential to the unfolding of the Israel-Palestine issue.
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CHAPTER 4:
CONSOLIDATION OF POWER THROUGH LEGISLATION AND POLICIES

Introduction
This chapter examines how laws and policies have been used as a scalar fix to manage
the Palestinian population according to the interests of the dominating power, i.e. the Zionist
movement/Israel. The events and social factors chosen for this narrative show not only how
particular acts of legislation facilitated seizing power, but also how to maintain it while
suppressing social struggle from those being dispossessed. We will see how both official laws
and treaties as well as informal, but no less influential plans and policies legitimized and
institutionalized Zionist colonial rule at the expense of the formation of a Palestinian sovereign
state. Going beyond the level of establishing Zionist domination in the geographical area of
Palestine, this chapter also highlights imperial aspirations of foreign, hegemonic powers, first the
Ottoman and then the British Empire.
The chapter is arranged in six sections, which follow, as far as possible, a chronological
order of the Palestine-Israeli conflict. Each section addresses a separate, yet interrelated, social
factor that builds a dialectical relationship with the overall scalar fix Relation. The first section
looks at the beginning of foreign intervention in Palestine, triggering the first significant changes
to its social structure. This is followed by an analysis of the events and policies leading to the
ultimate scalar fix in the sphere of absolute space: the establishment of the State of Israel. The
second section of this chapter thus examines the Balfour Declaration, followed by an analysis of
the events of 1948/49 in the third section. The remaining three sections address various forms of
legislation in the post-state era and their impact on the dispossession of the Palestinians: the
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policies of Judaization, the Israeli rule over the Occupied Territories, and, finally, the peace
process manifested in the 1993 Oslo Accord and its follow-up agreements. Once considered
individually, these sections may be taken to a higher level of generality where they, considered
as a whole, illustrate clearly the process of ‘stealing the commons from under the goose’. Finally,
it should be noted that, as this chapter focuses on the scalar fix of legislation, some of the events
addressed here will appear again later on in the thesis under consideration from a different angle.

4.1 The Beginning of Foreign Intervention
Until restructuring efforts by the perishing Ottoman Empire in the late 1800s, the area
today known as Palestine was characterized by a distinct socio-economic structure rather
different from Western, capitalist principles. Despite the presence of some 50,000 Ottoman
soldiers in the area, the indigenous people lived a rather autonomous life, primarily based on
subsistence agriculture and a system of social governance defined by kinship and family
relations. The system of land tenure was not based on private ownership, but title to land use was
ingrained in the masha’a system of collectivity which centered around village clans or families.60
In an attempt to increase revenue from its sub-provinces - those of Palestine being
Nablus, Acre and Jerusalem - the Ottoman Empire introduced the 1858 Land Code (Land
Reform). This new legislation provided for the issuance of title deeds and thus stimulated private
ownership of the land. The reform had several severe effects on the traditional land tenure
system and was, overall, to the disadvantage of the peasants, for it constituted a breaking up of
the traditional masha’a structure and its replacement by an individual land-holding system.61
Thus many peasants, failing to formally claim the title for the land they had cultivated for
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generations, lost their rights to property to those who had the means to land acquisition: tax
collectors, moneylenders and urban nobles.62 The increasing dependency on the new landowners,
many of whom resided in remote places like Beirut and Damascus, also signified the deprivation
of the people’s socio-economic rights and the end to their self-sufficiency. This change in
relations opened up first opportunities to establish the practice of hired labor, forcing peasants
who could not afford it to give up farming the land and work under the big landowners who had
little interest in subsistence agriculture but set out to commercialize the land, changing the
system to cultivating profitable cash crops which could be exported as raw materials to Europe.
This transition of peasant life is of critical importance for the course of events that were to unfold
throughout the following century and half. Not only did it affect a fundamental change of the
political and economic structure of society, the peasant transition would also provide the base for
recruits to the Palestinian resistance movement.
Simultaneously to the Ottoman reforms in the mid-19th century, the traditional structures
were grossly disrupted by an increasing penetration from European powers. As a result of the
scramble for control over the much coveted ‘Holy Land’ and its indigenous population, within
which France and Russia had succeeded to patronize the resident Catholic and Orthodox
Christians, Britain decided to cooperate with Prussia to create their own religious ‘protégé’
community consisting of the Jewish and Protestant population in the area. As their small number
provided a rather limited opportunity to establish substantial influence in the region, immigration
to the ‘Holy Land’ was greatly advocated in Europe. The resultant influx of missionaries along
with merchants and capitalists from Europe further infiltrated the socio-economic structure with
European values and the capitalist mode of production. As part of that, a local banking system
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was modeled after European institutions under the leadership of Jewish and Orthodox Greek
financiers, ignoring the indigenous peasant population which was deemed little suitable for this
task.
In summary, this section shows the manifestation of foreign influence in legislation and
policies as a function of scalar fix, laying the groundwork for the destruction of an indigenous
population and social structure which was to give way to a capitalist, Western system
implemented and exercised by a Westernized immigrant population: the European Jews.

4.2 The Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate
At a time when crucial decisions had to be taken, decisions which affected the
entire future of the inhabitants of Palestine, these same Palestinians were virtually
unrepresented in London, while the Zionist spokesmen were strongly entrenched in
the corridors of power and made astute use of their influence.
Mayhew and Adams63

Perhaps the most significant document for advancing the Zionist cause is the Balfour
Declaration from 1917, which has been understood as an official commitment from the British
government to the Zionist plan of establishing a Jewish homeland (read: state) in Palestine. The
statement issued in November 1917 confirmed that:
His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for
the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it
being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious
rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by
Jews in any other country.
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The issuance of a declaration in favor of the Zionists was not a spontaneous act but rather
the result of a series of debate and negotiation stretched over a period of several months. The
original ‘formula’ for the Zionist enterprise was submitted by the Jewish banker Lord Rothschild
and proposed that
1.

His Majesty’s Government accepts the principle that Palestine should be reconstituted as
the National Home for the Jewish people.

2.

His Majesty’s Government will use its best endeavours to secure the achievement of this
object and will discuss the necessary methods and means with the Zionist Organization.64

It is not difficult to see that, in comparison, the initial proposal was much more
straightforward than the final document, showing little attempt to conceal the Zionist motives.
The reason for the not insignificant alterations lies in the differing positions of the three parties
involved in shaping the declaration - the British War Cabinet, the Zionist Organization and the
representatives from the non-Zionist Jewry of England - all of whom were intent on, naturally,
pursuing their own agenda.
It is important to note that the support for the Zionists by both the British government as
well as the War Cabinet had not existed as a longstanding policy, but was formulated as an
official position only months before the Declaration due to several factors. One major aspect was
the immense lobbying efforts by the Zionists, which will be addressed in the following chapter.
For the time being, it suffices to consider the temporal and geopolitical context of this change in
the official position at the time. While then foreign secretary, and eponym of the declaration, Sir
Arthur James Balfour, had indeed been supportive of the idea of creating a Jewish state in
Palestine, he initially preferred that a protectorate be under American responsibility. This attitude
was to change, however, with Britain’s increasingly precarious situation in the war. As Germany
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was advancing further into Russia, seeking to consolidate its power there, the British War
Cabinet was in dire need for a political countermeasure. Realizing the imminent danger of an
alliance of the Kaiser with the Zionist movement in Germany - which would have severely
threatened both the British position in the war as well as its imperial interests overseas - the
British War Cabinet decided to declare its sympathy with the Zionists and support their
ambitions to create a national home in Palestine. The benefit for the British Empire was expected
to be twofold: (1) to win the war and (2) to maximize Britain’s position in its aftermath.
The temporal component was also decisive for the Zionists to gain the support from the
Jewish elite born in England, many of whom - out of fear for their status as British citizens - had
taken a rather anti-Zionist position. The events of WWI and the brutal persecution of Jews in
Eastern Europe provided a unique window of opportunity for the Zionists to ‘sell’ their idea to
their co-religionists. Whereas the increasing number of Jewry favorable towards the plan of
creating a British protectorate in Palestine facilitated collaboration with the British war
government, it remained the role of the British Jewry to intervene in the negotiations to protect
the rights of Jews in Europe, a circumstance which was to benefit the indigenous population of
Palestine. This is reflected in the second part of the official declaration, which provides a
‘humanitarian clause’ designed to protect the “civil and religious rights” not only for the Jews
worldwide, but also of the indigenous population of Palestine. It should be noted here that the
latter, the very people whose land was under discussion, were not consulted at all.
The exclusion of the native Palestinians was supported by Lord Balfour who did not
deem it necessary to consider the “wishes of the present inhabitants”, for Zionism “be it right or
wrong” was more important than the “desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now
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inhabit that ancient land,”65 Consequently, while the declaration promised the Palestinians civil
and religious rights, there was no mentioning of political rights, such as the right to selfdetermination and sovereignty.
The formation of the declaration thus reflects the power constellation at the time, which
was to define the further development of the conflict. Even the reflection of British interests in
the Declaration fades in comparison to those of the Zionists, who inarguably succeeded to
express their objectives concealed under vague language - a style which was to become
characteristic of Zionist and later Israeli policy making. As David Hirst comments:
The document bears Balfour’s name, but in reality it was the Zionists themselves who, in very
large measure, both inspired the Declaration and framed its text. It must be reckoned the finest
flower of Zionist diplomacy at its most sophisticatedly ambivalent. …suffice it to say here… that
the Zionists who framed the declaration saw in it the charter of a future Jewish state…66

History has indeed shown that little attention was paid to the ‘humanitarian clause’ of the
Declaration protecting the right of the Palestinian Arabs, an empty phrase merely added to
appease the British Jewry and gain their support for the Zionist enterprise. On the contrary, the
Balfour Declaration was to become the ultimate document - the scalar fix - to justify the
establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. Thus, the notion of inequality between Jews and
Palestinians was a crucial factor of consolidating power, set to dispossess an entire people, from
the very beginning, for it was “built into British, and subsequently Israeli and United States,
policy from the start.”67
In order to obtain international recognition for this unilateral statement by the British
government, the Balfour Declaration was incorporated into another act of legislation, providing
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another scalar fix: the Mandate for Palestine, assigned to Britain in 1922 by the League of
Nations. While the Mandate contained various provisions to safeguard the rights of the
Palestinians, its greatest significance was constituted in article 4, which recognized the Zionist
Organization/Jewish Agency as the public body charged with facilitating the Jewish immigration
process under the control of the Palestine Administration.
The creation of the mandate, based on the Balfour Declaration, marked a new era for
Palestine as it gave a significant uplift to the Zionist enterprise and the creation of Jewish
settlements in the region. The Israeli geographer and historian Gideon Biger describes the
significance of this development as follows:
We have Great Britain to thank for creating a geo-political framework where only hazy notions
had gone before. For the first time in hundreds of years, people understood that the territory of the
south of the Levant […] was in fact a distinct geo-political entity that was not part of the larger
countries lying beside it. This was important because it finally allowed the region to develop on
the strength of its own resources…The inhabitants could now focus their energies on development
within a defined circumference, and lay the basis for […] a ‘national image’ and ‘spatial
iconography’, namely symbols, values, and acts that define the physical and human geography of
a specific territory.

68

For the Zionists, this meant that their enterprise was now taking shape, being given an
official geographical conceptualization and spatial representation of their idea of Eretz Israel. For
the Palestinians, on the other hand, the Mandate rule was a catalyst to develop a stronger
resistance to what they well knew was a threat to take over the territory in which they had lived
for hundreds of years. Thus Arab violence against both British rule and Zionist invaders
increased considerably during the 1920s and 1930s.
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The Balfour Declaration as a function of scalar fix served as a conceptualization of space
in that it provided a geopolitical framework with territorial boundaries. Yet, its impact clearly
went beyond the sphere of conceptualized space, for it was not the actual wording of the
Declaration, but the intention of its makers and interpretation by those in power which lent it its
significance. It was this sense of power from ownership, the command and domination over
space which we find at the intersection of absolute and lived space in Harvey’s matrix of
spatialities, which gave the Balfour Declaration - and through it the Mandate over Palestine - its
leverage as the powerful tool of dispossession it was to become.

4.3 The Plan for Ethnic Cleansing and the Establishment of the State of Israel
Britain’s increasing failure to handle Arab resistance, as well as its weakened position at
the end of World War II, led to the decision to abandon the Mandate in 1948. Leaving Palestine
without any arrangements for a follow-up administration presented a structural vacuum which
the Palestinian leadership - plagued by disunity and lack of organization - was not positioned to
fill.69 The Zionist leaders, on the other hand, seized the opportunity and began preparations to
take over official leadership as early as May 1946.
Following an examination of the situation in Europe as well as in Palestine by several
international committees in the aftermath of WWII, UNSCOP (United Nations Special
Committee on Palestine) proposed a Partition Plan which paid little attention to the reality on the
ground but rather constituted “a radical territorial redistribution in favor of the Zionists.”70 The
plan allocated 55% of the land to a Jewish state, ignoring the fact that the Jewish inhabitants
comprised less than one third of the overall population, holding less than 7% of the land (see
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figure 3).71 Even more problematic was the fact that nearly half of the people within the
proposed Jewish state were Arabs. A mere glance at these figures leads to suspicion about the
practicality of this solution to the Palestinian question. Would the Palestinians, who had
repeatedly voiced their objection to a partition of their land, but had failed to propose an
alternative solution, accept this plan? Would the large Arab minority within the Jewish state be
treated fairly? While there was reluctance among the UN member states to accept the partition
plan, continuous Zionist lobbying efforts, particularly in the US resulted in an approval of the
plan, with thirty-three states voting yes, thirteen no, and ten abstaining from their vote.72
The Zionists took this as encouragement for the next step of their Judaization project, i.e.
the eviction of as many Palestinians from the potential Jewish state as possible. The expulsion of
a large proportion of the indigenous population by force had been meticulously planned, making
use of vast amounts of intelligence about the Palestinian villages which had been gathered in
minute detail by the Zionists. Several documents outlining these plans were issued, the most
detailed being Plan Dalet,73 which gave exact information about the demographic and geographic
composition of the villages and clear instructions for them to be attacked and in most cases
destroyed (see Appendix A). This shows that the brutal measures were not randomly committed
and should not be attributed to intangible factors such as "the circumstances", but were part of a
distinct overall plan to change the demography in the area in favor of a Jewish majority.74 The
systematic approach to ethnic cleansing started in March 1948 - two months prior to the end of
the British Mandate and before the outbreak of the war with the Arabs.
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Figure 3: Landownership in Palestine and the UN Partition Plan, 1947. (Source: PASSIA)

It is important to recognize the significance of Plan Dalet as scalar fix, which established
a Jewish majority in Palestine by driving out the indigenous population. Without the measures
prescribed in the plan the declaration of an Israeli state would not have been possible. Overall,
the Nakbah (Arabic for catastrophe) resulted in the eviction of more than three-quarters of a
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million Palestinians from their homes.75 Those who had been living in the territory designated by
the UN as the Jewish state were affected the most: out of 850,000 inhabitants only 160,000
remained. After bulldozing hundreds of villages in rural Palestine and altering the landscape
“beyond recognition,” the next step was to change the Arab names of the villages into Hebrew to
emphasize the Jewish character of the new settlements that were to be built and, as David BenGurion explained, “to prevent future claim to the villages.”76
The troops sent by neighboring Arab countries in order to save the Palestinians from the
Israeli onslaught came too little too late. Although almost equal in numbers, they were no match
to the well-trained, well-disciplined and highly motivated Zionist brigades, many of whom had
gained experience in the British army during WWII. The Arabs did succeed, however, in
preventing the Zionists from taking over all of Palestine, for Yigal Allon admitted later on: “If it
wasn’t for the Arab invasion there would have been no stop to the expansion of the forces of
Haganah…”77 The armistice line drawn in 1949, which was internationally recognized as Israel’s
official border, enlarged the Jewish state significantly, leaving a mere 23% of the proposed
Palestinian state for the Arabs (see figure 4).
The recognition of the state of Israel through the UN may be considered as the ultimate
scalar fix in terms of bounding the territory of absolute space. Yet, more importantly, it
consolidated Jewish power in granting Israel full sovereignty as a state with all the rights and
obligations defined by international law and consensus. The pre-1948 structures and
organizations were now transformed into elements of the state. The Haganah, which had been
mainly responsible for resistance against British rule and the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians,
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was converted from an “illegal underground organization”78 into the Israeli Defense Forces. On
top of that, even terrorist groups like Irgun and Stern were successively incorporated into the
state army - although not until they had done their service as terrorist organizations, including the
assassination of UN mediator Count Bernadotte.79

Figure 4: Arab territories seized by Israel in 1948/49. (Source: PASSIA)
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The new state was inherently discriminatory towards its Arab population, for according
to its courts, Israel constitutes “the sovereign State of the Jewish people.” This does not only
refer to “the people residing in Israel, but also [to] the Jews in the Diaspora.” Hence, an Israeli
nation that equates to the world Jewry excludes, by definition, any non-Jewish population from
citizenship.80 Although the Palestinians who had succeeded to remain on their lands were granted
citizenship - turning them into ‘Israeli Arabs’ - they have been treated as ‘second-class’ citizens
ever since, a point which will be addressed later on.
Most importantly, the new state institutions provided the Zionist organization with the
necessary authority to legitimize their project of colonizing Palestine. Whereas land had been
acquired in the free market during the pre-state period, it could now be appropriated in a more
‘efficient’ manner, with the state apparatus able to pass necessary legislation to justify and
facilitate confiscation of the land. Thus the power of the Zionist Jews, defined by their distinct
political, economic and social dominance, was further consolidated and legitimized, providing
the legal framework for continuing land redemption and consolidation of Jewish hegemony.
In addition to the large-scale dispossession of the Palestinians, the Jews took over
everything left behind by the British, including military bases and bank accounts. The British,
after having left the Palestinians at the mercy of the Zionists, were thus complicit in making the
dispossession of the Palestinians complete: in the early 1950s the governmental accounts for the
Mandate located in London were handed over to the Jews, depriving the Palestinians from any
share of the wealth that had been accumulated during 30 years of British rule.81
The Palestinians, on the contrary to the Jews, have to this day not come to enjoy the
privilege of statehood. This state of tremendous imbalance - Israel’s sovereignty and Palestine’s
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non-sovereignty - has been of great significance for the relations of the two people as well as the
wider area of the Middle East, as has been shown in the latest violent outbreak, the war on Gaza.
While Israel claims the right to self-defense and the use of arms in order to protect the population
of its state - rights which are recognized by fellow UN member states - the Palestinians in Gaza
are internationally condemned for having to resort to illegal measures such as the smuggling of
weapons - their only means to be able to engage in self-defense, a right they are deprived of in
the absence of sovereignty.
Whereas the declaration of Israel’s statehood - and Palestine’s lack thereof - is a key
point in the consolidation of Zionist power, it is also imperative to consider its representation in
the aftermath, i.e. its impact on the conceptualized and lived space, which will be addressed in
chapter 6. At this point, we can conclude that not only the declaration of the State of Israel
functioned as a scalar fix. Perhaps even more importantly, it was the scalar fix of policy making
in form of unofficial plans that facilitated the colonial, or capitalist-imperial, ambition of the
Zionists.

4.4 Judaization and the Consolidation of Territorial Boundaries
Another aspect towards a full understanding of the extent of the Zionists’ deliberately
planned dispossession of the Palestinian people is the scalar fix of Judaization in conjunction
with the consolidation of the territorial boundaries of Eretz Israel. From the outset of the Zionist
colonization enterprise at the turn of the 20th century, the territorial configuration of Jewish land
holdings in Palestine, which was to lay the foundation for the state of Israel, was determined by
the creation of another scalar fix: the seemingly irreversible ‘facts on the ground’. As shown in
figure 4 (p. 53), the Jewish settlements were strategically well positioned, and their location was
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strongly taken into consideration by the several committees appointed to investigate the situation
in Palestine, eventually leading to the Partition Plan proposed by the UN in 1947. As Ghazi
Falah points out, the settlement frontier determined the boundaries of the Partition Plan, a fact
that was very well known to the Zionists who created Jewish settlements “in the Naqab [Negev]
literally overnight” to ensure the area be included in the proposed Jewish state.82
The ‘Green Line’ represents another such ‘fact’. After ignoring the initial borders
proposed in the 1947 Partition Plan, the preliminary boundary between Israel and the remaining
Palestinian lands was determined to be along the 1949 armistice line, an act which significantly
increased the territory of the Jewish state. While originally drawn merely to depict the location of
the armed forces at the time of the ceasefire, the Green Line has found wide acceptance - both by
Israeli and Palestinian negotiators - as a default border between Israel and a potential Palestinian
state, and as a premise for any peace negotiations. As a consequence of this institutionalization
of the Green Line, demographic distribution of the Palestinian population was largely ignored,
disrupting indigenous villages and townships.83
In order to ensure its ‘Jewish character’, land confiscations within Israel proper have
continuously altered the territorial configuration of the state. The pre-state strategy was to
establish core settlements in the most valuable and fertile areas of Palestine. The declaration of
the state of Israel converted these Jewish enclaves within the majority Palestinian areas into
officially recognized “national space of the new state.”84 At the same time, it was the Arab land
that was now turned into ‘enclaves’ within the Israeli state, rendering the remaining Palestinian
villages more vulnerable to fragmentation and expropriation. Scholars have aptly described this
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continuous process of deliberate dispossession as the “alienation” and “shrinking” of the
Palestinian land aimed at the “Judaization” of Israel,85 a process through which the territory
under Israeli control, a governmental or Zionist agency, has increased from some 77% after the
1948/49 war to more than 90%.
Several laws were put in place in order to facilitate the expropriation of Arab land, which
is protected under the 1960 Basic Land Law, stating that the “ownership of lands, being the lands
in Israel of the State, the Development Authority or the Keren Kayemet le-Israel [i.e. the Jewish
National Fund], shall not be transferred either by sale or any other manner.”86 As the State of
Israel explains on its website, this law is based on “the special relationship between the People
… and the Land of Israel and its redemption,”87 providing a protective mechanism to ensure its
exclusive use by Jewish people.
In addition, the Israel Land Administration has devised Master Plans for the
development of Arab villages which deliberately exclude land privately owned and inhabited by
Arabs. Demarcated as lying outside the jurisdiction area of the local municipality, and
consequently excluded from officially recognized residential areas, the villages in these areas are
barred from economic and social development and rendered more vulnerable to future
dispossession.88 As a result, the Arab lands have become increasingly fragmented, aiding the
Judaization policy of the Israeli government. In many cases the policy of non-development
involves entire villages and townships that are primarily inhabited by Palestinians. To this day,
there are hundreds of unrecognized Arab villages in Israel, manifestations of distinct Palestinian
space, whose existence is categorically denied as they appear on no maps and are not included in
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any plans for socio-economic development. The fact of non-recognition enables the confiscation
of this Arab land, as the expulsion of Palestinian inhabitants and their transfer into
“concentration townships” goes literally unnoticed.89
With the beginning of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, similar policies were
adopted to the areas outside Israel’s sovereign territory.90 During the 1967 war and its aftermath
the establishment of legal (i.e. by Israeli standards) and illegal settlements was justified as
necessary to build a ‘security zone' near the Green Line. Whereas in 1967 the Israeli government
had brought 9.3% of the West Bank under its control, it had confiscated nearly half of the entire
area by 2000.91 Figure 5 visualizes the quantitative change in settlements in the West Bank,
excluding East Jerusalem, since the beginning of the occupation. It clearly shows the significant
increase in settlers in more recent years, jumping from 176,500 in 1999 to 275,156 in 2007 and
defying all pledges and agreements to freeze settlement activities.

Figure 5: Growth of the settler population, excl. East Jerusalem. (Source: PASSIA)
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There are several dimensions to the way the Jewish settlements among Palestinians in the
OT (Occupied Territories) have an impact on the conflict. Not only has the increasing number of
Jewish settlers changed the social relationship with the Arabs, leading to increasing tension that
translates into violence, it also consolidates Israeli control over the Palestinian territory and its
people. The construction of the Jewish settlements - connected through bypass roads designated
for Jewish use only - separate the Arab villages and townships from each other and disrupt
Palestinian life. These settlements are - unlike the Palestinian areas - subject to Israeli law and
receive preferential treatment in terms of political and civil rights. As will be shown in the next
section, Israel’s policy is to seize the land while managing the indigenous population in a way
that denies them fundamental rights granted to the Jewish settlers.
Once these ‘facts on the ground’ have been created, they become a significant point on
any negotiation agenda, ranking almost equally with critical issues such as Jerusalem and the
right of return for Palestinian refugees.92 Thus, the longer those settlements exist, the more
justified seems their existence, for an increasing number of settler descendants appear to make a
reversal of the settlement process ever more unthinkable. Taking a step back to look at these
‘facts’ as a whole, we can consider the settlements as a dialectical Relation in itself and thus
understand and appreciate the significance of the tremendous change that has occurred in
Palestine, not by accident by through deliberate policies. To this day, the settlements in the OT
have been a major obstacle to a solution of the conflict between Israel and Palestine. With resortlike housing complexes replacing degenerate villages and Zionist settlers displacing Palestinians
into “concentration townships”, the settlements are the manifestation of uneven development in
the area. The settlement Relation thus shows clearly the Zionists’ success of stealing “the
commons from under the goose.”
92

Newman, op. cit., p. 636.

55
4.5 The Military Administration in the Occupied Territories After 1967
After its conquest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip within six days of June 1967, Israel
established a new scalar fix to manage its newly obtained territories in form of a military
administration, designed to utilize the territory for its own interests while neglecting the rights of
the Palestinian people. While the previous legal system - Jordanian and Egyptian law for the
West Bank and Gaza respectively - remained largely in place, ultimate authority was conferred
upon the Israeli military commander, whose military orders (MO) - of which more than 2,500
were issued throughout the years of occupation - immediately became effective law.93 The
military jurisdiction served several functions. Not only did the complex legal system sanction
“the legality, legitimacy, and morality of the occupation,”94 the laws and institutions established
by Israel were also designed to control literally all aspects of life in the OT and to shape the
socio-spatial practices of the Palestinian people.
Apart from the military rule, a number of key institutions were utilized to control the
population, first and foremost the General Secret Service (GSS), also known as Shin Bet. The
enormous influence of the GSS went beyond the ‘usual’ information gathering, using
surveillance methods similar to those of the Stasi apparatus of the German Democratic Republic.
Most importantly, with no legal authority in charge of it, the GSS functioned above the law. This
lack of accountability facilitated the agency’s engagement in coercive activities such as illegal
detentions and torture.95
Another control mechanism that interfered grossly with the socio-spatial practices of
Palestinians has been what Israeli professor of politics, Neve Gordon, described as the permit
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regime. Palestinians in the OT had to obtain permits for nearly every kind of activity, from
planting new trees for the citrus plantation, to carrying out any type of electricity work, to
purchasing and operating a tractor. Permits were also issued, or more often not issued, to control
and restrict the movement of people within as well as to and from the two regions, the West
Bank and Gaza. Even the right for Palestinians to move freely within their cities and villages was
often severely restricted through curfews and closures. A point in case is Hebron, where a 24hour curfew was imposed for four days during the Passover holidays in 1995 in order to allow
Jewish residents and visitors to spend their holiday without the ‘disturbance’ by the locals.96
The act of issuing or withholding a permit was utilized as a tool to blackmail and
manipulate individuals, as granting a permit was often conditioned on collaboration with the
occupying power. Gordon points out that the permit regime transformed basic rights into
privileges and thus shaped all types of social relations as well as the behavior of people. While
this extensive surveillance and control mechanism was applied to the Arab population, the
military rule did not apply to the increasing number of Israeli settlers in the OT. The highly
unequal treatment of the two groups of people led to the growing dispartment between the Arabs
and the Israelis, as well as increasing resentment by the former for the latter. 97
Similar effects were produced through the perpetual inequity in formulating economic
policies for the Palestinians and Jews, both in Israel proper and the Occupied Territories. Overall
investment in the dilapidated economy of the OT was kept at a minimum as to avoid the
development of a strong, sustainable economy and produce an increasing dependency on the
patron, Israel. The net transfers the Israeli government received from the OT, which could have
improved the development of Gaza and the West Bank significantly, were not reinvested in the
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area. As Sarah Graham-Brown observed in 1989, “it seems that the territories today largely
finance the Israeli occupation, rather than vice versa.” Indeed, the annual report of the
administration for the fiscal year 1984/85 suggested that the occupation (excluding military
expenses) “hardly costs the Israelis anything.”98
Instructive for our understanding of the occupation’s crippling effects on the indigenous
Palestinian economy is an extensive study on the economy of the Gaza Strip by AmericanJewish scholar Sara Roy, who has referred to Israel’s policies as a “political economy of undevelopment.” While Palestinian workers had to pay taxes at a much higher percentage than
Israeli workers, they were not entitled to any benefits. In addition, whereas the Israeli
agricultural sector was highly subsidized, there were hardly any financial incentives for
Palestinian farmers and entrepreneurs in Gaza, thus making it impossible for them to compete
with their Israeli counterparts.99
Another case in point illustrating the uneven development is the distribution of water
rights. While military orders placed tight restrictions on water use as well as the digging of new
wells for Palestinian farmers, the Jewish settlers enjoyed free usage of water and drilled between
35 and 40 new wells in Gaza within the first two decades of the military administration. To
express this inequity in concrete figures: the Jewish settlers in Gaza used an average of 2,326
cubic meters of water per capita, whereas the water usage for Gazans amounted to merely 123
cubic meters per capita.100 Israel’s economic policies were clearly designed to disable the
Palestinian economy in order to contain the threat of competition and economically strengthen
Israel.
98

Graham-Brown, S. (1989). The Economic Consequences of the Occupation. In N. Aruri (Ed.) Occupation: Israel
over Palestine. Belmont, MA: AAUG Press, p. 333/334.
99
Roy, S. The Gaza Strip: Critical Effects of the Occupation. In N. Aruri (Ed.) Occupation: Israel over Palestine.
Belmont, MA: AAUG Press, pp. 249-296.
100
Ibid., p. 277.

58
With the lack of economic development within the territories, an increasing number of
Palestinians joined the labor force in Israel. While the payment there was much higher than any
potential earnings in the OT, the average income for Palestinians was still merely one sixth of
that of an Israeli worker. At the same time, a substantial amount of funding was available for
Jewish people wishing to settle in the West Bank and Gaza. As one settler confirmed:
All one needs to do in order to qualify for such a sum is to decide that one wants to join a settlement.
Various institutions will then look after all one’s needs: a truck is sent to help one move; one is
given a place to live and a plot of land as well as other means of production worth many millions [of
lira]. 101

This indicates that the Palestinian territories have served as a crucial investment
opportunity for over-accumulated capital while at the same time allowing for the pursuit of
imperialist objectives: whereas Palestinian farmers and entrepreneurs were exploited, Jewish
settlers benefited from seemingly unlimited capital inflows. This dialectical relation of
contradiction furthers our understanding of the increasing frustration among the Palestinian
population in the OT that would eventually lead to the first intifada in 1987.
Overall, the permit regime was designed to make the occupation “invisible” as to avoid
the formation of any meaningful, organized resistance from the Palestinians. For that reason, the
military administration only acted at the higher levels, whereas Arab officials remained in their
positions at municipal and local levels. Furthermore, Israel established an official Civil
Administration over the Palestinian Territories in 1981. What was supposed to be an end to the
military rule was in reality merely a change in names, creating an illusion of normal social
relations which served as a disguise for increasingly coercive measures of control.102 Thus the
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Civil Administration provided a newly consolidated form of power, or scalar fix, with the
objective to enhance the semblance of normality. Yet, the forms of control mechanisms
established under military rule did not change with the new administration, merely the way they
were deployed.
Despite these efforts to ‘normalization’, Israel failed to suppress resistance to the
oppressive occupation all together. Since the 1967 war, the relationship between Israel and the
Palestinians in the OT has been defined by the mutual reinforcement of the two social factors occupation and resistance. To the extent that the former has shaped the latter, the resistance also
defined the mechanisms and methods of Israeli military rule.
That the Civil Administration still had a tight grip on the social structure of the OT can be
seen in an examination of foreign efforts to foster socio-economic development in Palestine. In
his detailed analysis of the most significant development agency for Palestine active during the
pre-Oslo years - the Geneva-based Welfare Association (WA) - Palestinian scholar and
development consultant Khalil Nakhleh reveals numerous obstacles to genuine, sustainable
development and empowerment of the indigenous Palestinians. As all money to be allocated to
the Palestinian economy was controlled by Israeli rule, efforts of foreign ‘developmental’
intervention were greatly restricted. Moreover, while the WA succeeded in establishing a
considerable development fund, the achievement of genuine development was greatly
exacerbated, as every single project required a priori approval and cooperation from the military
authorities.103
Another great impediment to development was the growing corruption, both among
founding members of the WA, most of who were Palestinian businessmen, and within the
various factions of the PLO which had become increasingly institutionalized within the OT
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during the first intifada. Albeit clear principles for a genuine development had been established,
they were not internalized by the founding members, and the actual intervention on the ground
gave a different picture from that stated in the objectives. Rather than providing aid to those
projects in need, the corrupted leadership of the WA often allocated funds to befriended
entrepreneurs in the OT, hoping to establish a good position for themselves for the expected
Palestinian autonomy.

4.6 The Oslo ‘Peace Process’ - A Peace to End all Peace?
The following analysis will not only expose the Oslo Accord as a contradiction in itself,
but as a culmination of all four types of relations used in the dialectical method, showing that the
treaty and its ensuing negotiations and agreements did not bring the promised peace, but rather
intensified the conflict.
The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles signed on 13 September 1993 was the
response to six years of brutal violence that had evolved since the outbreak of the first Intifada in
1987. In this declaration, the two sides, i.e. the State of Israel and the Palestinian delegation,
representing the Palestinian people, agreed “that it is time to put an end to decades of
confrontation and conflict.” They further pledged to
recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and
mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and
historic reconciliation through the agreed political process.104

What came to be known as the Oslo Accord contained big words and great ideas, which
according to Arafat marked “a new era in the history of the Middle East”105 and, at the time, may
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have sounded rather promising to some. Yet a closer look at the Accord’s individual articles and
annexes would have immediately raised suspicion. In hindsight, the agreement may doubtlessly
be judged as a failure.
Indeed, scholars have argued that the Oslo Accord, along with its ensuing agreements,
was bound to fail from the very beginning of the negotiations, primarily due to the differential
treatment of two supposedly equal negotiation partners. On the one hand, power games between
the external PLO and the negotiators from the West Bank and Gaza significantly weakened the
Palestinian party already during the preparatory stage. In stark contrast to Israel, the Palestinian
negotiators went to the talks lacking the bare minimum of preparation: neither were they in
possession of maps of their own, nor did they have any detailed knowledge or a firm
commitment to “principle and justice.”106 Consequently, the negotiations were held primarily on
Israeli terms, for the PLO was eager to make concessions to Israel in order to ensure their own
position in power. Failing to understand the political and historical context and significance of
the negotiations, the PLO leaders entirely ignored the demands of the Palestinian people, most
importantly a sovereign state and the rights for those hundreds of thousands of refugees and
diaspora in Europe and the US to return to their homes.107
In adherence to a Kissinger memorandum issued almost two decades before, the Oslo
agreement embraced a ‘step-by-step’ strategy, promising a Palestinian statehood only in ‘final
status negotiations’, which were to come into existence only after certain conditions were met,
including the Israeli withdrawal from most of the Palestinian areas. Thus, the crucial issue of
sovereignty was deferred to an undetermined point in time - which, indeed, has yet to
materialize. What the Palestinians received instead was an ‘autonomy’ regime of the Palestinian
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Authority under which Yassir Arafat succeeded to establish a repressive one-man rule with a
corrupt, incompetent bureaucracy considered by Edward Said “worse than the cooperation with
Israel” established to eliminate ‘opponents’ of the peace process.108 The Israeli journalist Danny
Rubinstein compared the autonomy granted to the Palestinians with the situation “in a POW
camp, where the prisoners are ‘autonomous’ to cook their meals without interference and to
organize cultural events.”109 In other words, whatever little self-rule was transferred to the PLO,
the actual state of affairs was still under final supervision by Israel.
In addition to the PLO’s abuse of its position as the representative of the Palestinian
people, the agreement has been continuously violated by Israel. Not only was the agreed
schedule for redeployment of Israeli troops in the West Bank delayed, it was in fact never
completed. To this day Israel remains in control of the entry points to Gaza and the West Bank as
well as the villages near the Green Line deemed for military or state use. Moreover, figure 6
shows how the West Bank remains highly fragmented through the numerous closures (i.e.
checkpoints, road gates, earth walls etc.) maintained by Israel.110 As Israeli historian Ilan Pappe
points out, the Zionist state continues to rule with “brutality and callousness” over what amounts
to more than 50% of the land.111
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Figure 6: Location of closures in the West Bank. (Source: OCHA)
Such violations were in fact facilitated by the vagueness of the language in the Oslo
agreement which, by and large, merely stipulated further negotiations and agreements, rather
than providing clear assignments for both parties. Thus, the provision that the status of the West
Bank and Gaza should not be changed notwithstanding, the Accord does not explicitly prohibit
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the further spread of settlements in the territories. Within the decade following the first Oslo
agreement in 1993, the number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank nearly doubled, “creating an
imagined map of a Jewish West Bank above, in more than one sense, the Palestinian one.”112
The Jewish settlers literally surrounded the Palestinians from all sides, with tunnels
below and highways above them. In their function as ‘bargaining chips’ in the peace
negotiations, the location of the Jewish settlements have had a significant impact on the proposed
land distribution between Israel and the aspired Palestinian state, whereby some 161 Palestinian
enclaves in Areas A (Palestinian cities) and B (Palestinian villages) are surrounded by Area C
containing all the Jewish settlements and Israeli military areas.113 Figure 7 shows the division of
the West Bank into Areas A, B and C as discussed during Oslo II negotiations, 1995. The map
clearly shows that, at that time most of the West Bank territory was still under Israeli control.
The Israeli settlements, roads and military areas grossly disrupted the urban and rural areas,
preventing the consolidation of a structured coherence within a future Palestinian state.
At the Camp David II negotiations in July 2000, Ehud Barak made a “generous offer” to
the Palestinians, which proposed to incorporate a significant area of the West Bank - in part
temporarily and in part permanently - into the state of Israel. The remaining Palestinian land was
to be even more fragmented through the separation into three areas that have been described as
‘Bantustans’, emphasizing the similarities to the geopolitical conditions of South Africa under
the Apartheid regime.114 It should be no surprise that Arafat rejected Barak’s offer, which
allowed Israelis to “live in continuous space” where they “enjoy free movement” while
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“Palestinians are compelled to reside in an array of newly generated enclaves.”115 The second
intifada which followed the failed negotiations was thus a clear reflection of how far away the
talks had moved from the realities of the events in 1948 and the possibility of a sovereign
Palestinian state, which had been promised more than 50 years before.

Figure 7: Oslo II Map (Source: Palestine Center)
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Another dimension of the ‘peace process’ was the opening up of new channels for
increased capital inflow to foster economic development through the international community, a
process which Khalil Nakhleh exposed as a myth.116 While the Oslo accords allowed and
encouraged big monetary investments in the Palestinian Territories, no genuine development
strategy was developed, especially from the EU, the largest donor of Palestinian aid in the postOslo years. Moreover, crucial technical assistance for development projects was outsourced to
what Nakhleh termed “New Mercenaries” instead of incorporating the indigenous population,
thus rendering the latter the “weakest political element”, “non-participant actors” on whom
foreign, ill-conceived policies were imposed.117
Finally, whatever little structural and developmental improvement was achieved after the
Oslo agreements, it was completely reversed with the re-occupation of the OT by Israel in 2002.
Witnessing the destruction of houses with bulldozers and the imposition of new curfews
accompanied by continuous gunfire in Ramallah, Nakhleh described the irony of the events:
Each time some of the tanks and armored personnel carriers rumbled down the road in which I live, visible
and audible from my office window, I would continue, calmly and coolly, to analyze the process of
‘developing’ and ‘un-developing’ Palestine.

The well formulated objectives for developing not only a healthy Palestinian economy
but also a coherent, self-confident society were nothing but rhetoric in the sense of Orwellian
doublethink, for the end result of immeasurable efforts and millions of aid was complete undevelopment of an entire people. As Nakhleh concludes: “This is a process of un-developing
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Palestinian society, undermining and dismantling any potentially viable Palestinian
institution.”118
Indeed, some scholars consider the Oslo accords and the ensuing agreements as an
official consent to Israeli occupation - a “consolidation of Israel’s territorial gains in Gaza and
the West Bank.”119 At the same time, Israel received international credit for making ‘peace’ while continuing its occupation. The socio-spatial inequality between Israel and Palestine could
not be more clear.
While Oslo was supposedly the hallmark of the peace negotiations, the so-called
‘process’ remained rather stagnant and never reached its goal. As none of its objectives were
achieved, the ‘peace process’ became an empty phrase without meaning. Yet, it remains firmly
in place. As if its existence was appeasing the Palestinians, the never-ending ‘peace process’
continues, with renewed efforts whenever it seems in Americas or Israel’s interest. The ‘process’
is “reinvented all the time … [and] America thinks … as long as there is a ‘process’, God is in
heaven” noted Palestinian scholar and activist Hanan Ashrawi.120
Contrary to its promise of a solution to the Palestine-Israel conflict and the prospect of
bringing peace to the Middle East, the Oslo Accord and its follow-up agreements had a further
consolidating effect for the status quo. Said noted that, albeit acknowledging its injustice, many
Palestinian and Arab scholars and intellectuals, as well as those supportive of Palestine, have
argued that the agreement between Israel and the PLO – for which Arafat shared the Peace Nobel
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Prize with Rabin and Peres - should be accepted as a “reality” and that practical proposals should
be made as to how to “deal” with the contemporary situation.121
Oslo also marked the beginning of the PLO’s – and later Fatah’s – cooperation with
Israel, bringing the Islamic resistance movement, Hamas, to the forefront of Palestinian
opposition. Taking the place of PLO, Hamas has refused to recognize Israel and takes a strong
stand in their demands for Palestinian sovereignty. Despite immense criticism of Hamas’
position, the Israeli journalist, Danny Rubinstein evaluated the situation as follows:
If you add to this the growth of settlements in Samaria, Ariel, the suburbs of Ramallah, in an
expanded Gush Etzion and Mount Hebron, the Israeli message becomes unequivocal: You
Palestinians have no chance. You recognized Israel and what you received in return was the
liquidation of your national hopes. So why should Hamas repeat the same recognition whose results
we have already seen?122

Conclusion
This chapter examined the formation of various, select policies, treaties and legislative
acts which, in their function as scalar fix, have played a significant part in shaping Palestinian
space and consolidating the dispossession of the Palestinian people since the first immigration
waves of Jewish settlers driven by Zionism at the end of the 19th century. In that sense,
combining all the aspects discussed in the individual sections as internal relations of the act of
dispossession - in itself a factor within the overall process of uneven development - allows us to
realize the extent of the rise of Zionist power and expose the Zionist/Israeli leadership as “those
who steal the commons from under the goose.” It further helps us to put Palestinian resistance, in
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form of the two intifadas or handmade rockets fired from Gaza into Israel, into perspective and
to begin to gain understanding of the motivation for such acts of violence.
Yet, this dialectical analysis needs to be taken further and investigate the workings
‘behind the scenes’ which allow the policy making examined in this chapter to be established. In
order to illuminate these processes, the following chapter will analyze the scalar fix of
networking, first by revisiting two key events leading to the creation of the State of Israel: the
Balfour Declaration and the UN Partition Plan of 1947, and second by examining the ‘special
relationship’ between Israel and the US.
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CHAPTER 5:
CONSOLIDATION OF POWER THROUGH NETWORKING

Introduction
This chapter illustrates how the establishment of social networks and close relationships often based on economic, religious or ideological grounds - facilitates the consolidation of
power, i.e. the scalar fix of dispossession. Given the extent of influence that networking activities
exercise in determining the flow of social activities as well as finance capital, I have argued in
chapter 3.4 that networking in itself constitutes a function of scalar fix. As will be shown in this
chapter, the identification of networks as a form of scalar fix is essential to the extent that the
processes of legislation and policy making discussed in the previous chapter were largely driven
by the collaboration of individuals and groups pursuing common interests of capitalistimperialist nature. It is the very coherence among the ruling classes which serves as facilitator of
dispossession and oppression which otherwise would be easy to break up and resist.

5.1 Pre-State Efforts
Some of the major treaties and doctrines discussed in the previous chapter came about
through workings ‘behind the scenes’. In order to illuminate these processes we will revisit two
key events leading to the creation of the State of Israel: the Balfour Declaration and the UN
Partition Plan of 1947.
We have already noted that the formation of the Balfour Declaration was considerably
shaped by temporal components. However, full understanding of the issuance of the document
requires a look at the networking mechanism among the British pro-Zionist Jewry and the ties it
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established with influential politicians at the time. The point of origin of this Jewish network was
Manchester, where Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann (later to be first President of the State of
Israel) was employed as a lecturer in bio-chemistry at the University of Manchester. Not only
was Manchester home to a great part of the British Jewry but also counted foreign secretary Lord
Balfour and Prime Minister Lloyd George among its constituents.
Weizmann established a support group of influential Jews, starting with the Jewish
banking elite, the Rothschilds, who controlled not only Britain but virtually all Europe
financially and politically, being largely involved in capitalist-imperial ventures in Asia as well
as South America.123 While the majority of the Rothschild family had been explicitly anti-Zionist
in the late 19th century, the events of WWI brought them much closer to the Zionist enterprise.
Weizmann was thus able to secure the backing of Sir Walter Rothschild, heir of the Rothschild’s
quasi-monarchical status among British Jewry, who introduced him to influential figures in
British politics - the potential supporters of the Zionist project. Among them was Sir Herbert
Samuel, who had been attracted to the Zionist idea even before the war, and who was later to
become the first High Commissioner for Palestine. In a memorandum circulated in March 1915,
Samuel laid out his thesis for a British protectorate in Palestine, arguing that British control over
the area would be the best possible solution in the Empire’s interest:
Its establishment would be a safeguard to Egypt […] It is hoped that under British rule facilities
would be given to Jewish organizations to purchase land, to found colonies, to establish
educational and religious institutions, and to co-operate in the economic development of the
country, and that Jewish immigration, carefully regulated, would be given preference, so that in
course of time the Jewish inhabitants, grown into a majority and settle in the land, may be
conceded such degree of self-government as the conditions of that day might justify….
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The course which is advocated would win for England the gratitude of the Jews throughout the
world In the United States, where they number about 2,000,000, and in all the other lands where
they are scattered, they would form a body of opinion whose bias […] would be favourable to the
British Empire.124

In addition to his relations with the Rothschilds and other members of the elite,
Weizmann’s work as a chemist, in particular his research on the mass production of acetone,
made him an invaluable asset to the British military, bringing him into close contact with war
Prime Minister Lloyd George and providing the opportunity to introduce the Zionist project to
the British government.125 Moreover, his contributions to British war strategy helped Weizmann
establish close connections with and gain substantial support from influential members of
government such as General Jan Christian Smuts, who in 1917 was sent as the ‘Special Delegate
from South Africa’ to the War Cabinet in London, and who, not surprisingly, supported a policy
for Palestine similar to the colonial regime in South Africa.
The UNGA Partition Plan from 1947 was noted as the second decisive document that
enabled the power consolidation leading to the State of Israel. It is thus worth examining the
influence of Zionist efforts in the background. The idea of partitioning the land to establish an
independent Jewish and Palestinian state had existed for more than a decade and had been
recommended by several foreign committees which, in response to the growing violence, were
established to examine the situation in Palestine. Figure 8 shows the recommendation of the
Royal Peel Commission, which in 1937 proposed to allocate less than one fifth of Palestine to a
Jewish state, leaving the rest of the area to the Palestinians. Comparing the Peel proposal to the
UNGA Partition Plan ten years later (see figure 8), it is obvious that the area assigned to the Jews
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had grown considerably. Scholars suggest that the commissions’ increasingly favourable attitude
towards the Jews - neglecting the Palestinians’ refusal of partition of their homeland - were the
result of immense Zionist lobbying efforts in Britain and the US, coupled with the manipulative
interference with the investigations conducted by officials from the committees.
Towards the end of World War II, examination did not only involve the situation in
Palestine but also that of the DP camps in Europe, a fact which the Zionists used to their
advantage. When the Anglo-American Committee toured the DP centers in 1946, Zionist
officials organized the visit and thus ensured that only those Jews in favor of establishing a
Jewish state were interviewed by the committee. Similarly, travels around Palestine were
influenced by the Haganah, presenting the highly developed Jewish settlements and their
beneficial impact on the backward Palestinian Arabs. This was backed up with a thousand-page
report issued by the Jewish Agency which portrayed the Zionists as representatives of
“enlightenment and progress”. The one-sided representation of Palestinian space left no room for
doubt that the Zionists were not only beneficial to the development of Palestine and its
indigenous population but indeed indispensable. The Zionists’ efforts had such an immense
impact on the committee members that even those who had been skeptical at the outset of the
investigation became staunch supporters of the Zionist cause.126
The investigations by UNSCOP (United Nations Special Committee on Palestine), were
handled in a similar manner, so that its officials - who knew little about Middle East affairs and
had visited Palestine only briefly - were more impressed by the tragedy of the Holocaust in
Germany than the Palestinians’ fear of an outbreak of Zionist violence and takeover of their
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land.127 Thus, due to the splendid presentation and constant pressure by the Zionists and the lack
of any meaningful counter-measures by the disunited Arabs, UNSCOP proposed a division plan
which was to lay the foundation for the Jewish state.

Figure 8: Partition Plan of the Peel Commission, 1937(left) in comparison to the UNGA
Partition Plan, 1947 (right) (Sources: PASSIA; MideastWeb)
127
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This brief analysis strongly suggests that the Zionist networking efforts played a
significant part in shaping the events that led to the establishment of the State of Israel - to the
extent that the legislation and policies might not have come about had it not been for the Zionist
influence. Whereas the scope of this thesis only allows for a basic introduction of this form of
scalar fix, a more-in depth examination is necessary to expose the full extent and impact of the
power of networking regarding the creation of the Zionist state. The following section will
examine another angle of the Zionist network and its function as scalar fix: the Zionist power
configuration in the US.

5.2 The “Special Relationship” Between the US and Israel

It is not possible to discuss the US imperial system without drawing attention to
the anomalous position that Israel holds within it. James Petras128

At the beginning of World War I, the majority of American Jews did not support
Zionism. This was to change, however, as the Balfour Declaration gave legitimacy to the plan of
Israeli statehood in Palestine. The Declaration enabled Zionists to “tap the funds collected by …
non-Zionist organizations” and thus helped the movement to expand its influence on the Jewish
population.129 The American government, however, showed little interest in Palestine - a position
which was not to change until Israel’s war in 1967.
Since then, a close relationship has emerged between the US and Israel, not only
economically, but also on a political scale. As I have argued in chapter 3, the 1970s saw a shift in
US policy towards a neo-liberal politics that emphasized the accumulation of finance capital.
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Since the beginning of that decade the US began to take advantage of Israel’s ‘advanced’ state of
development, being “the only developed capitalist country in the Middle East.”130 In line with its
containment policy against the Soviet Union, the US supported the Jewish state’s objective to
achieve regional economic dominance through massive loans and grants. The resulting
relationship of Israel with its surrounding Arab neighbors has been described as “classical
colonial”, with the occupied Palestinian territories, as well as Syria and Lebanon supplying
capital and skilled labor and cheap agricultural products to Israel.
The imperial interests of both the US and Israel are a major defining factor of the
relationship between the two countries. This is reflected not only in the capital logic of power
(i.e. the unparalleled financial assistance provided by the US), but also in the territorial logic or,
more plainly, the military relationship. While Israel has enjoyed a massive transfer of arms and
weapons from the US, it has in return supplied munitions and military services to US-allies in the
Middle East region as well as in Africa. With the help of aid from the US, Israel has assisted in
training soldiers in former Zaire, Ethiopia and South Africa. Thus, the US and Israel share in
their imperialist objectives, not only to gain influence on a regional but also on a wider scale.
This has also affected peace negotiations in the Middle East, which the US often
manipulates to Israel’s advantage. In the 1973 war, it purposefully ‘prolonged’ diplomatic efforts
as to “delay the Security Council in order to give Israel 72 more hours to fight.”131 At the same
time, the US position was not to merely provide unconditional support to Israel, as the increasing
need for oil also determined America’s “interest in the 130 million Arabs that sit athwart the
world’s oil supplies.”132 Peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt throughout the 1970s under
the initiative of US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, were thus complicated; and the Jewish
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state agreed to give up the Sinai Peninsula only after extensive assurances and repeated written
agreements were made, stating that the US would compensate Israel for its abandonment of the
Egyptian oil fields and guarantee its oil supply.133 These concessions were accompanied by
guarantees to aid Israeli defense through increased arms supplies, as well as loans and grants,
averaging $2.2 billion per year between 1976 and 1980.134 After the initial failure of Kissinger’s
shuttle diplomacy, the US deliberately decided to implement a “step-by-step” strategy towards a
peace process where Israel would not be forced to discuss critical issues such as borders and the
Palestinian right to return. This approach has been maintained, leading ultimately to the failure of
the Oslo Accord (see chapter 4.6).
Israel’s ‘special’ relationship with the US has given the Jewish state a jester’s license to
ignore international law and condemnation of its policies and remain firm in its discriminatory
position towards the Palestinians. Numerous UN resolutions - most famously Resolution 242 have been passed to outlaw Israel’s longstanding occupation of Palestinian territory and its
indiscriminate warfare against Palestinians and Lebanese - to no avail. Resolutions by the
Security Council are either vetoed by the US or outright rejected by Israel. A UN General
Assembly resolution on 13 November 2006 condemning the massacre of Beit Hanoun and
calling for an investigation was also ignored by the Jewish state, which instead continued its
assault on the Palestinian people.135 Even proposals for peace negotiations advanced by Hamas
as early as 2005 were rejected on grounds that Israel does not negotiate with ‘terrorist
organizations’. Instead, it responded with an economic blockade on the Gaza strip and several
airstrikes in 2006, leading to the death of some 400 Palestinians, more than half of them
civilians. The United States also stood firm with Israel in its rebuff of a proposal by UK Prime
133

The Abu Rudeis oilfields in the Sinai had supplied 55% of Israel’s oil needs.
Bahbah, B. (1982). The United States and Israel’s Energy Security. Journal of Palestine Studies, 11 (2), p. 129.
135
Petras, op. cit., p. 115.
134

78
Minister Tony Blair for a Middle East conference which was to bring all parties to the table,
including Israel and Palestine, Syria, Iran and Iraq.
The ‘special’ relationship, however, is not just defined by America’s unconditional
support for Israel and the latter’s total dependence on the former. Rather a mutual dependence
has evolved which allows Israel at times even to dictate to the US. Nor is this a recent
phenomenon, as the circumstances of the attack on the USS Liberty by Israeli forces at the onset
of the war in June 1967 show. Despite great efforts from the Pentagon and Defense Secretary
Robert McNamara to cover up the facts and silence the surviving crew members, evidence has
shown that the attack by Israeli fighter planes was not an accident at all. The Israelis knew very
well before the assault that the ship they were about to attack was under American flag. Evidence
even suggests that the attack was planned beforehand and ordered directly by then Israeli
Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. While this was very well known to the Americans, they agreed
to cover up the deliberate attack on one of their ships. As Jeffrey St. Clair concludes, “the IDF’s
strike on the Liberty served to weld the US and Israel together, in a kind of political and military
embrace.” Little wonder then that Palestinians see the Israeli attacks on their townships and
villages as a “joint operation, with the Pentagon as a hidden partner.”136
In recent years, Israel’s position also allowed the Jewish lobby, and if necessary the
Jewish state itself, to interfere in US foreign policy with Iraq and Iran. When the US government
mandated the Baker commission to examine and evaluate the situation in Iraq, it took Israeli
President Olmert’s direct intervention to dismiss the resulting recommendations to engage in
diplomatic talks with Iran and Syria over Iraq. While the Baker report was published in a rather
friendly environment, and was thus expected to be incorporated in US foreign policy making, it
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failed to have any positive impact on America's position towards Iran and Syria. On the contrary,
as relations between the US and Iran became increasingly aggravated over issues of nuclear
proliferation and intervention in Iraq, it was mainly the Jewish lobby in the US which advocated
a war in Iran. The lobby perpetually distributed war propaganda dismissing not only Iran’s claim
of pursuing a peaceful nuclear research program but also affirmative findings by the IAEA
commission.137
This somewhat curious behavior by a rather small and young state which is highly
dependent on foreign financial and military aid, merits a closer look at the supporting network
that operates in the US - the Zionist power configuration (ZPC), to use James Petras’ term. The
ZPC includes 51 national Jewish organizations (including the America-Israel Public Affairs
Committee, or AIPAC, and the Anti-Defamation League) under the umbrella of the Conference
of Presidents of the Major American Jewish Organizations (CPMAJO) as well as several
hundred Jewish Federations on a regional and local scale. Additional financial support comes
from Jewish millionaire (and billionaire) donors, but also a great number of political action
committees, whose names do not indicate any connection to Israel but which raise funds for the
Jewish state.
Even more difficult to pinpoint and to measure is the impact of an array of cultural,
“fanatical” activists who reprimand and counter anything and anybody critical of Israel.138 That
said, the following example of ‘activism’ is illustrative. In April 2008, it was discovered that a
pro-Israel activist group, CAMERA (Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in
America), had drawn up a plan to infiltrate Wikipedia with its own people who - once being
established as neutral administrators - would change articles relating to the Palestinian-Israeli
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conflict in favor of the Zionist narrative. The plan is said to have been abolished after it was
uncovered.139
With this tight network in place, the sway of the ZPC goes far beyond the lobbying
activities of AIPAC and the like. Petras identified a number of major, Washington-based think
tanks, including the American Enterprise Institute and the Project for the New American
Century, which frequently publish position papers, editorials and opinion pieces in prestigious
newspapers, and whose political analysts and Middle East ‘experts’ appear regularly on TV news
programs and political debates, presenting a pro-Israel point of view.140
Furthermore, the ZPC asserts direct influence on US policy making. Not only is the
network’s political pressure able to ensure up to 98 percent within the US Congress to support
any legislation in favor of Israel, it also controls - directly or indirectly - the most influential
positions in the US administration. Close examination reveals what has been termed a “dual
loyalty”, i.e. the relationship between the above-mentioned think tanks and US government
officials. Two of the most senior officials in the US State Department under the Clinton
administration, who were responsible for the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, had held the
position of director for a pro-Israeli think tank either before or after becoming a US government
official.141 The already intimate ties between the pro-Israel activists and the US government
intensified significantly under the Bush administration, where ever more “Israeli loyalists”
entered the government on all levels.142 During the first term of the Bush presidency, the White
House was influenced, among others, by speechwriter David Frum, Special Assistant Elliot
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Abrams, and Bush spokesman Ari Fleischer, whereas the Pentagon was under the pressure of
Israel supporters Donald Rumsefeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Dov Zakheim and others. While the names
may have changed during Bush’s second term in office, the influence remained. The same can be
said of the new Obama administration, given the fact that Obama’s first appointment was Chief
of Staff, Rahm Emanuel, a former volunteer in the Israeli Defense Forces and son of a member
of the Irgun. This continuing presence of “Israeli loyalists” in the US administration clearly
highlights the effectiveness of the scalar fix of networking.
The persistent pressure on members of congress also ensures that any attempts to criticize
Israel for its aggressive policies are effectively silenced. Both Congressman Earl Hilliard and
Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney fell victim to this practice, after demanding more fair
Middle East policies as well as a proper investigation of 9/11. After AIPAC and other Jewish
organizations provided large financial support to their (pro-Israel) opponents, both were defeated
in ensuing elections. For Cynthia McKinney, who had tried to fight back by gathering support
from Arab-American groups, the battle against the American Jews ended with a media attack by
the Lobby for receiving funds from “pro-terror Muslims”.143 Hilliard’s reputation was similarly
destroyed in a slandering campaign in the corporate media. In general, the dual loyalties seen in
the US government seem to be expected from all American Jews. If a Jew speaks out against
Israel, or even reveals the horrendous practices of Israel’s continuing dispossession of Palestine
in a publication, he or she is openly denounced as a ‘self-hating Jew’.144
Given its immense influence, the Lobby also plays a significant role in the portrayal of
Israel in the media and public opinion. At times of war, the Lobby launches huge media
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campaigns, ensuring that Palestinians (and Arabs from neighboring countries) are portrayed as
‘terrorists’, while the occupying Israeli army is represented as the victim.145 In the 2006 war on
Lebanon, the corporate media - pressured by the Jewish lobby - upheld Israel’s claim of
adherence to the ‘purity of arms’ doctrine and outright ignored crucial facts of its discriminatory,
disproportionate warfare. What was widely omitted was the grossly disproportionate ratio of less
than 100 dead fighters to more than 1000 Lebanese civilians who were killed in the Israeli
onslaught which launched an average 5,000 missiles and bombs (including cluster and
phosphorus bombs) per day.146 Like the assault on Gaza in 2008/9, the attack on Lebanon in
2006 had apparently been planned long beforehand, a fact also omitted by the Jewish lobby and
mainstream media.
Yet at times of war such as the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and 2006 or the attack on
Gaza in 2008/9, even the powerful pro-Zionist media cannot entirely refrain from reporting on
the horrible atrocities committed by Israel. Hence, argues Edward Said, we notice in the
aftermath of the war “a tremendous Zionist effort” to bring “the media and the public back into
line.”147

Conclusion
If we recall Swyngedouw’s understanding of scale as “embodiment and expression of
power relationships” as well as Smith’s argument that the scalar fix provides a “platform and
container for certain social activities” we find that networking indeed stands out as a function of
scalar fix. Using dialectics, we further realize that the scalar fix of networking is internally
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related with the scalar fix of legislation. This has been shown in the formation of the Balfour
Declaration, as well as the UN Partition Plan, both of which may not have come about without
the consolidation of Zionist power through networking.
The scalar fix of networking also pursues a capitalist-imperialist agenda, as the
examination of the ZPC reveals. It is the solid establishment of the Jewish influence in the US
which has upheld the “special relationship” between the global hegemon and the regional leader
of the Middle East, enabling the latter to withstand substantial threats to its existence from
neighboring countries for decades. Considering the phenomenon of this “special relationship”
from a dialectical perspective shows that there is really nothing “special” about it: the close
collaboration between the US and Israel is an internal relation of both the Zionist movement
(and, by extension, the State of Israel) and the United States, aiding both significantly in their
pursuit of consolidating power.
The examples presented here are by no means exhaustive, but indicate the potential of the
networking power. Additional research will have to be done to further our understanding of the
scalar fix of networking. The challenge, however, lies in revealing those processes and
operations of networking which are often conducted in secrecy in order to avoid the revelation of
their manipulative character.
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CHAPTER 6:
CONSOLIDATING SPATIAL REPRESENTATION - SCALING KNOWLEDGE
The events [of Oslo II] are a remarkable testimony to the rule of force in international affairs and
the power of doctrinal management in a sociocultural setting in which successful marketing is the
highest value and the intellectual culture is obedient and unquestioning. The victory is not only
apparent in the terms of Oslo I and II and the facts on the ground, but also in the demolition of
unacceptable history, the easy acceptance of the most transparent falsehoods, and the state of
international opinion, now so submissive on this issue that commentators and analysts have literally
forgotten the positions they and their governments advocated only a few years ago, and can even see
that 'Israel agrees to quit West Bank' when they know perfectly well that nothing of the sort is true.
Noam Chomsky148

Introduction
The scalar fix of knowledge primarily targets one act of dispossession: the denial of a
Palestinian narrative and thus the creation of an image of Palestinian ‘non-existence’. As the
control over the production of knowledge takes on multiple facets, occurring on various levels
and affecting a range of elements of society, this chapter examines a range of fields responsible
for the dissemination of knowledge - all of which are utilized as means to scale any knowledge
related to the Israeli-Palestine conflict.
The first section investigates the field of education, academics and scholarship regarding
the history of Palestine, both analyzing how knowledge is imparted and, more significantly, how
it is produced. The analysis first addresses the scaling of the Palestinian national curriculum,
followed by a discussion of issues regarding scholarship, most notably the historiography of the
events of 1948. The second section examines the role of the media in its function of controlling
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the spread of information and knowledge. Addressed are issues of censorship of the Palestinian
press as well as the pro-Israel bias of the mainstream media in the West. Building on this
discussion the third section analyzes the use of terminology and how public discourse is steered
towards a pro-Zionist image that demonizes the Palestinian people, dispossessing them of any
opportunity to function as a genuine, sustainable society. The main focus will be on the power of
the label of ‘terrorism’, used to curtail the legitimacy of any resistance to dispossession and to
justify the use of force to suppress that resistance.
As has been the case in the previous two chapters, the social factors, or Relations,
abstracted in this chapter - education, media and discourse - are understood as internal relations
of the Zionist enterprise and its objective of Palestinian dispossession. Bearing this approach in
mind, the following narrative exposes acts of dispossession that go in fact beyond the material
world of land and water rights, moving to the core of the issue - the Zionists’ aim to oppress any
form of Palestinian social structure.

6.1 Education and Academics
One dimension of scaling knowledge is found in the school education of children, which
provides the setting for manipulating the socio-spatial awareness of the youngest elements of
society at early age. In an effort to manage the people of the West Bank and Gaza, Israel’s
military administration implemented drastic, restrictive measures in the realm of producing and
disseminating knowledge. This affected the professional and private life of school teachers who
were under tight surveillance as engagement in any sort of political activity was strictly
prohibited. While those teachers previously employed under Jordanian and Egyptian
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administration were allowed to remain in schools - a measure to enhance the occupation’s
‘invisibility’ - all new hires were subject to approval by the GSS.149
Overall, the adherence to the prescribed curriculum was closely monitored to ensure
teachers not engage in any extracurricular teaching activities with the potential to plant any seeds
of resistance in the children.150 The curriculum was constrained to the use of textbooks that had
been subject to perusal, whereby chapters with any sort of anti-Israeli content were eliminated.
Moreover, any teaching of Palestinian history was censored, as it was feared that such
knowledge might foster sentiments of a Palestinian identity and thus stimulate hostility towards
the occupation.
The scaling of knowledge was by no means restricted to the Palestinians, for it also
targeted the population of Israel, which was made believe that the West Bank is indeed a part of
the Jewish state, dropping the fact that there was a place called Palestine into the Orwellian
memory hole. The internationally acknowledged border from 1948, the Green Line, was erased
from all maps, atlases and Israeli textbooks, while the area itself was no longer referred to as
West Bank or eastern Palestine - which would have been the actually correct term - but was
given back its biblical names: Judea and Samaria. The Israeli media portrayed the claim that
Israel’s action in the West Bank and Gaza was not only moral, but also beneficial to the
Palestinians.151
Contrary to the expectations in the Oslo agreements, the strict censorship of the
educational system was not entirely abolished with the official end of the military administration.
Even after formally taking control of their educational system in 1994, the Palestinians were
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“still not masters of their own destiny,” and the publication of new school texts was subject to
harsh criticism.152
In 2000 the Ministry of Education of the Palestinian Authority (PA) introduced new
textbooks. This was done after careful analysis of the existing curriculum and textbooks, and a
thorough discussion of how to perceive and teach Palestinian history and geography involving
teachers from Gaza and the West Bank. Unlike Israeli textbooks, which still contain maps
demarcating Israel’s border to be the Jordan River, the PA books did not contain any maps of
Israel or Palestine, stating that the borders of the former have yet to be defined and those of the
latter are still subject to negotiation. They did, however, present a Palestinian narrative
describing the declaration of Israel’s independence in 1948 as part of the Palestinian Nakbah
(catastrophe), during which the majority of native Palestinians were evicted and their villages
destroyed.153
The textbooks and curriculum were closely monitored by Israeli and pro-Israeli groups in
the US, and were strongly condemned in a rather influential report issued by the Center for
Monitoring the Impact of Peace (CIMP), which concluded that
[ever] since the PA became responsible for education in 1994, Palestinian children have been
learning from their schoolbooks to identify Israel as the evil colonialist enemy who stole their
154

land.

After being quoted and referred to by a number of US politicians, including then
President Clinton who called on the PA to change the “culture of violence and … incitement
that, since Oslo, has gone unchecked,”
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decided to divert money designated for educational needs to other sectors, whereas Italy
withdrew its funding for developing a new Palestinian curriculum all together. A study found
that, by merely relying on the CIMP report without examining the books themselves, numerous
governments and donor groups failed to realize that the document contained many falsehoods,
most notably its claims that the PA school texts delegitimized Israel and advocated anti-semitic
books. In reality, the new Palestinian texts, contrary to CIMP’s accusations, did not contain any
negative stereotypes of Jews, whereas Israeli school books “continue to present Israelis as peace
loving and Arabs as terrorists who prefer war.” 156
The practice of scaling knowledge and discourse also prevails in academics and public
discourse, both in Israel and Palestine but also abroad. Under the military administration in the
West Bank and Gaza, a large number of academics and intelligentsia, especially those trained
abroad, were driven out from the West Bank and were often times not allowed to return, an act
facilitated by the fact that many of them were considered ‘foreigners’ since they happened to be
abroad at the time of the census in 1967. In addition, student life was made rather difficult, as
dormitories were frequently disturbed by night raids and going to class was disrupted by military
checkpoints and the confiscation of student IDs.157
In addition to the control of what type of knowledge is imparted, the scalar fix manifests
itself in the influence on the production of knowledge, in our case the historiography of the
Palestine-Israeli conflict. While much of what has been written (excluding publications from
Arab sources) shows an overall bias towards Israel, scholarship has particularly denied the facts
of the circumstances that led to the declaration of Israel’s statehood - the ethnic cleansing of
1948. As the Israeli historian Ilan Pappe observed:
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…when it comes to the dispossession by Israel of the Palestinians in 1948, there is a deep chasm
between the reality and the representation. … There is no doubt that the ethnic cleansing of 1948,
the most formative event in the modern history of the land of Palestine, has been almost entirely
eradicated from the collective global memory and erased from the world’s conscience.158

For several decades after the war, the Zionist historiography presented a rather distorted
account of the events on the ground in relation to the Jewish “war of independence.” The official
Israeli version stated that the Palestinians had left their homes voluntarily, as “Arab leaders
broadcast orders … to evacuate their country preliminary to its ‘invasion’ by the regular Arab
armies.”159 While several Arab scholars, including Walid Khalidi, tried throughout the 1960s and
70s to investigate the true circumstances of the civil war, mainstream Israeli scholars abided by
the version of the Israeli government. It was not until the 1980s, when the declassification of
Israeli archives enabled ‘New Historians’ like Tom Segev, Avi Shlaim and Benny Morris to
depart from the official narrative and address the occupation, destruction and expulsion of large
parts of Palestine. Yet, Khalidi points out “a lingering reluctance even in these writings” to see
the relation of the expulsion of the Palestinians to the Zionist objective of Judaizing the land.160
On the contrary, the incidents of the Nakbah and the civil war are portrayed in isolation, as if
their concurrence in time was merely accidental. In what was to become the first groundbreaking
work disclosing the realities of the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians, Benny Morris still
adhered to the Zionist version of history, to the extent that he failed to conclude that the
expulsion of the Palestinians was a willful act. Instead he stated that they partially “left” as a
result of the war.161
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A somewhat alternative, yet similarly misleading view has advocated a causal fallacy,
claiming that it was the civil war itself which “inevitably” led to the expulsion of the
Palestinians, rather than the other way round. Pappe accounts as one reason for the Nakbah
denial for several decades the “absence so far of the paradigm of ethnic cleansing.”162 He further
argues that the civil war of 1948 was “the consequence, the means” to carry out the planned
eviction of Palestinians.163
This reluctance to see the Nakbah in the proper - relational - perspective does not seem to
have changed much. Even as late as 1998, at a conference between Palestinian and Israeli
scholars, the latter represented by the ‘New Historians’ Morris, Pappe and Sternhell, the Israelis
considered the Zionist political movement and the violent expulsion of a quarter million
Palestinians in 1947/48 a ‘necessity’.164 Furthermore, in his “objective” account on the ArabIsraeli conflict from 2001, Righteous Victims, Benny Morris still does not take the thoroughly
planned ethnic cleansing for what it was. While the book presents more than a century of history
in painstaking detail, the blueprint for the ethnic cleansing, Plan Dalet is mentioned only briefly,
without any detailed attention to the meticulous planning which provided the basis for the
expulsion of the Palestinians. Addressing the refugee problem, Morris even argues that, in light
of the disastrous socio-economic conditions in Palestine, “for some, exile may have become an
attractive option, at least until Palestine calmed down.” While he acknowledges that the Zionist
leadership did espouse a compulsory transfer of Palestinians to the neighboring Arab states and
that “Plan D[alet] clearly resulted in mass flight,” he states that there was never an official,
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“systematic expulsion policy.” Rather, he concludes, the “exodus was, overall, the result of a
cumulative process and a set of causes.”165
The issue is handled with similar care by Avi Shlaim. In his book, Iron Wall, he first
argues that Plan Dalet was “not a political blueprint for the expulsion” of the Palestinians and
that it merely served “military and territorial objectives.” Then follows a somewhat contradicting
statement, in which Shlaim acknowledges that the violent eviction of the Palestinians was
“permitted and justified”, as Plan Dalet ordered “the capture of Arab cities and the destruction of
villages.”166
Apart from questions of the right paradigm to produce knowledge and how to incorporate
newly available sources of declassified documents, we also need to consider the authenticity of
the very files which serve as evidence for any historiography regarding the events of 1948. In
1995, Morris claimed that the Zionists had buttressed their distorted version of history by forging
several files from the period of the civil war in 1948. Among a number of documents Morris
examined the diaries of two Zionist leaders: Yosef Weitz167 and David Ben-Gurion. While the
version of Weitz’ diary published in 1965 differed significantly from his original notes, leaving
out references to the ‘transfer’ of the Palestinian population168, an examination of Ben-Gurion's
diary - after being cross-referenced with other contemporaneous documents - showed that,
“essentially, Ben-Gurion had exercised effective self-censorship decades before the official
censors arrived on the scene.”169 This shows the depths in which knowledge and information can
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be manipulated to create a ‘reality’ which falsifies what was actually said and what really
happened. Thus, while the examination of original documents is essential for the writing of
history, this has to be done with extreme care.
It should be further noted that, overall, knowledge on Palestinian history has been written
mainly by non-Palestinians, oftentimes unable to avoid a certain bias. Even if an honest attempt
to objectivity is made, there are restrictions due to the biased use of sources, which often focus
on Western or Zionist documents, without hearing the Palestinian voices, those who in fact
experienced that history. Palestinian society thus becomes an “object rather than a subject of
history” which “can be described by others, but cannot describe itself.”170 This has facilitated
efforts to deny both the formation of a Palestinian identity and the narration of the people’s own
history.
To the extent that Palestinian scholars did conduct research on their people’s
development, Israeli dominance over Palestine and the wider area has had a severely damaging
impact on such scholarship. Most notably, as a consequence of Israel’s 1982 invasion of
Lebanon, a significant amount of documents and research that had been produced by the
Palestine Research Center and the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut was either seized by
Israeli forces or brought into safety, in both cases remaining inaccessible for a long time. This is
but one example of the relentless disruption of Palestinian scholarship which contributes to the
dispossession of the Palestinian narrative.
The invasion of Lebanon in 1982 also marks a shifting point in the way Palestinian ‘nonexistence’ is generally handled in Israeli and pro-Israeli discourse and scholarship. Whereas in
earlier years the formation of a Palestinian national identity was just ignored all together, the
aftermath of the 1982 war witnessed a more aggressive discourse of culture and history which
170
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openly dealt with the contemporary Palestinian people. Edward Said pointed towards two books
published in 1984 which drew much public attention and, after receiving numerous praising
reviews from major influential newspapers and journals, ranked high on the bestselling lists in
the United States. The first one is Joan Peters’ study on the history of the Palestinian people,
From Time Immemorial, in which she claims that the majority of the population of Palestine in
1948 was recent immigrants from neighboring Arab countries, and thus could not be considered
part of an indigenous non-Jewish population in Palestine. The book thus perfectly conforms with
the Zionist thesis and public opinion that there is no such thing as an indigenous Palestinian
people which could have any claim to the land, but that it is really the Jewish people that is
entitled to a sovereign state in Palestine. What is even more noteworthy, whereas similar theses
may have been discussed in scholarly circles, this book was addressed to a much wider audience
in the US, thus supporting the ‘education’ of the general public according to pro-Zionist and antiPalestinian lines.171
A similar judgment can be made about the second book addressed by Said, Leon Uris’
The Haj. Being a bestselling novel, it reached an even wider audience than Peters’ book. The
story is set in what is presented as everyday life in Palestine, whereby the Arab is portrayed as a
“lecherous, deceitful, murderous, irrational, larcenous, and utterly reprehensible subhuman,
while the Jew is “noble, intelligent, understanding, courageous, and, above all, deserving of
Palestine.” Albeit being full of “sheer disgusting hatred” and loathing, the book was publicly
lauded as a “work of penetrating, compassionate, and courageous humanism.”172
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Over the years, even those on the left who were once critical of Israel and have stood up
for those being dispossessed by imperialist ventures have moved more towards rightist lines
supporting the Zionist-imperialist logic. Both Chomsky and Said have condemned The New
Republic, a journal for politics and arts respected by liberals and “right-thinking intellectuals,”173
for its adoption of a strongly pro-Zionist attitude. In an article about a play describing the
relations between a German businessman, an immigrant Jewess, and an Arab Palestinian in
Jerusalem, the journal’s editor Martin Peretz, in denial of his true identity, simply described the
Palestinian in the play as an “Arab”,
a crazed Arab, to be sure, but crazed in the distinctive ways of his culture. He is intoxicated by
language, cannot discern between fantasy ad reality, abhors compromise, always blames others for
his predicament, and in the end lances the painful boil of frustration in a pointless, though
momentarily gratifying, act of bloodlust.

Peretz continues affirming the play’s “truthfulness”, for “we have seen this play’s Arab in
Tripoli and in Damascus, and … in hijacking a bus to Gaza and shooting up a street of innocents
in Jerusalem.”174
On the other hand, scholars and intellectuals in the US and Europe wanting to criticize
Israel’s politics of dispossession in Palestine often face harsh consequences. A point in case is
the career of the “accomplished scholar” and “excellent teacher” Norman Finkelstein, who
became known as an outspoken critic of Israeli politics towards the Palestinians, in particular its
abuse of the Holocaust.175 Already during his graduate studies did Finkelstein dare to denounce
Joan Peters’ above-mentioned, fraudulent work, From Time Immemorial.176 His 2005 book,
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Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History, which reveals the
practice of distorting facts in order to rewrite history under the disguise of academic scholarship,
caused a public controversy with far-reaching consequences. The work used Harvard law
professor Alan Dershowitz’ Case for Israel as a “springboard” to show the misrepresentation of
the documentary record of human rights issues involving Israel, a fact which Dershowitz was
unwilling to let pass without a response.177 While Finkelstein’s book was still in writing,
Dershowitz initiated a letter campaign trying to prevent the work from being published. Apart
from pressuring the publisher, University of California Press, Dershowitz took the apparently
unprecedented step of appealing to California governor Schwarzenegger.178 While these
measures did not succeed, Dershowitz continued his campaign against Finkelstein, contributing
to the fact that the latter’s book was widely ignored and, within 5 months of being published, did
not receive “a single review from mainstream U.S. publication”, whereas The Case for Israel has
been frequently cited as a reference. Moreover, the argument between the two scholars damaged
Finkelstein’s academic career, for he was denied tenure at DePaul University, where he had been
an assistant professor of political science. This is but one case that illustrates “what seems to be
the growing gap between the facts on the Middle East as accepted by scholars and the
representation of the Middle East situation to the wider public.”179

6.2 Media
The control of knowledge, i.e. the dispossession of the Palestinian’s right to freedom of
speech, has generally involved the regulation and distribution of any type of information in the
Palestinian territories. Under the military regime, the publication and distribution of newspapers
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was subject to a permit, whereby the term ‘newspaper’ included “any pamphlet containing news,
information, events, occurrences, or explanations relating to news items, stories or any other item
of public interest,” in other words, anything potentially affecting society one way or another.180
Thus virtually all reporting could only be done under strict censorship, so that articles addressing
the situation under occupation - be it curfews, strikes, or the dispossession of land and water could usually be mentioned only briefly, without providing any details or background
information. Anything deemed to have “illicit political content” was strictly prohibited. This
included “pictorial representations of Israeli soldiers assaulting Palestinian civilians, schools
surrounded by barbed wire, and the use of the colors of the Palestinian flag together.”181
Moreover, all published material was censored as to not encourage any discussion of
Palestinian identity. The inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza were thus not referred to as
‘Palestinians’ - which would imply a feeling of national identity - but as ‘Arabs’, hoping that
they would thus develop some form of pan-Arab sense of belonging. This also shows the clear
distinction Israel made between the Palestinian land and resources on the one hand and the
indigenous people on the other. While it was very much interested in absorbing the former, it
strove to expulse the latter by alienating the Palestinians from their land and destroying their
history and identity.
Censorship of the Palestinian press intensified during and after Israeli attacks on
neighboring territory. Once again, the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 serves as a case in point.182
Claims by the Civil Administration to allow and encourage freedom of expression
notwithstanding, the reality on the ground told a quite different story. A respective study listed
an array of incidents during the year following the invasion of Lebanon where Palestinian
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journalists and editors were prevented from doing their work, including measures such as
detention, beating, torture and threat of deportation. Primary targets were the three Arab dailies
in East Jerusalem: Al-Fajr, Al-Sha’ab, and Al-Quds - the very same papers Israel has used as
signboard for Palestinian freedom of press. The extent of press censorship was most obvious in
the reporting on local news: topics such as the creation of new Jewish settlements, the
dispossession of Arab land, but also the arrest of PLO members and the destruction of their
family homes were strictly prohibited. Moreover, news regarding the detention and deportation
of Palestinian intellectuals and academics or the closing of schools was frequently censored.183
Yet, similar to the military’s permit regime, the strict censorship did not succeed in suppressing
the rising resistance against Israeli occupation of the OT.
The dispossession of the Palestinian narrative and of the Palestinians’ right to be a
distinct, self-conscious people is also apparent in the Western media and its pro-Israeli bias.
News reporting in the US as well as in Europe is generally one-sided and distorted. The British
Broadcasting Corporation, BBC, serves as an illustrative example. Contrary to claims to
impartiality, honesty and integrity, the BBC’s reporting has been rather supportive of Israel,
displaying a clear antipathy towards Palestine. This was confirmed by two independent studies
conducted between 2004 and 2006, one of them commissioned by the BBC itself.184 Both studies
found that reporting on the Palestine-Israeli conflict lacks depth and detail, leaving the average
audience no opportunity to fully comprehend the complexity of the conflict. Not only are aspects
of the conflict, which would bring understanding of the Palestinian ‘side’ of the story, regularly
omitted, there is hardly any mentioning of the suffering of the Palestinians which has been a
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daily reality for six decades. In contrast, victimhood is ascribed to the Israelis, particularly the
settlers. Whereas their housing complexes have disrupted or destroyed thousands of Palestinian
livelihoods, the settlers’ ‘hardship’ in light of Palestinian resistance is perpetually
overemphasized. Gaza and the West Bank are generally merely referred to as ‘disputed’
territories, thus denying the fact that the occupation of Palestine is an illegal act condemned by
the international community. The Golan Heights, however, are not presented as occupied
territory at all. Similarly, the issue of growing settlements and continuous confiscation of
Palestinian land is hardly mentioned, and never condemned as ‘illegal’, thus ignoring
international law and UN resolutions, such as Resolution 194. Thus, whereas Israeli rights especially those of existence and self-defense - are repeatedly emphasized and supported,
Palestinian rights are outright ignored.185
Instructive is also the representation of the signing of the Oslo II agreements in 1995 in
the US media. The event was celebrated as “a historic compromise”, “a big one, making the
historic move toward accommodation of the two peoples all but irreversible.” Reports that Israel
had “agreed to quit the West Bank” and to extend “Palestinian rule to most of the West Bank”
stood, once again, in stark contrast to the reality, which had Israel in control of no less than two
thirds of the West Bank, at the time home to some 140,000 Jewish settlers, whereas the PA was
granted full control over merely 3% of the total land.186
Overall, the brutal warfare of Israel was and is not discussed widely in mainstream media
and public discourse. As the corporate, Western media generally supports the Zionist narrative safeguarded through an invisible line, “like a charged electrical cable” 187 - criticism of Israel and
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American politics in the Middle East is closely monitored and restricted by the Jewish lobby.
Attempts to cross the line are often times responded to with harsh slandering campaigns and
accusations of anti-Semitism by the Lobby. Journalist Alexander Cockburn, for instance, was
described as “a nasty piece of work”, “despicable” and with a “double moral standard” after
giving a detailed, truthful account on the invasion of Lebanon in 1982.188 Similarly, Independent
Middle East correspondent, Robert Fisk, having reported on the wars and conflicts of the Middle
East for more than three decades, states that the hate mail against him has become increasingly
violent and vulgar over the years, even including death threats. Another example is Northeastern
University of Boston professor, M. Shahid Alam, whose call for an academic boycott - intended
to be part of a peaceful alternative to violent resistance in Palestine - was greeted with stark
hostility in the corporate media which portrayed him as defender of Palestinian suicide
bombers.189 Israeli journalists are likewise affected, as the case of Amira Hass shows. After
living under Israeli occupation in Gaza and currently residing in Ramallah, to experience for
herself the situation for the Palestinians, the Haaretz correspondent receives offensive and
abusive messages “in the thousands.”190
But not only courageous journalists are silenced. An official report by the MacBride
Commission established to investigate Israel’s alleged war crimes during the 1982 invasion of
Lebanon found Israel guilty of violating international law, using prohibited weapons and
indiscriminately bombing civilian targets. The report was widely ignored in the West, especially
in the US, where the commission’s findings were not even published.191
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6.3 Terminology and Public Discourse
The differential terminology in public discourse reinforces the consolidation of identity,
i.e. the notion of an ideology of difference. As if to confirm Samuel Huntington’s thesis, we are
led to believe that there is indeed a ‘clash’ of two civilizations which are not only incompatible,
but whose relationship is defined by the moral superiority of one over the other. Whereas Israelis
are ‘murdered’ or ‘lynched’ by Palestinian ‘terrorists’, Palestinians are ‘merely’ killed or shot in
‘stone-throwing clashes’ and confrontations that could not be avoided by those Israeli soldiers
trying to ‘defend’ themselves and ensure the ‘security’ of the Israeli citizens.192 Furthermore,
while Israel is portrayed not only as innocent victim, but also benefactor to the Palestinians and
Arabs in general, the PLO and later on Hamas, representing the Palestinians, has been portrayed
as a “gang of thugs”, “the centre of a cancerous growth which has metastasized all over the
world.”193
To this day, public discourse provides no consideration for the overall context, as
Palestinians are dispossessed of their memory and past, and thus the world is denied a crucial
part of the overall story, debilitated of making a sound judgment. The issue of ethnic cleansing as if it never happened - is still not addressed in public discourse, let alone negotiations for
peace. All the while, it has been central to the Palestinian narrative and the way Palestinians have
defined themselves and their resistance towards the aggressor ever since. On the contrary,
Israel’s created ‘facts on the ground’ have come to be accepted as Palestinian historiography, as
the ultimate truth.
Edward Said finds it “simply extraordinary and without precedent” that Israel’s history of
a state founded on conquest and terrorism and its continuing occupation of what little is left of
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the Palestinian territory, in violation of international law, is never brought up in any public
discourse, nor subjected to careful analysis in the Western media or scholarship, or by US
politicians.194
Israel’s repeated attacks on its surrounding territory - be it the wars on Lebanon in 1982,
1993 and 2006, the conquests of the Golan Heights in 1967, or the various assaults on the West
Bank and Gaza - reveal the perpetual distortion of reality and the (mis-)representation of sociospatial practices in order to serve Israeli interests. This begins with the very names given to
military operations. In 1982, Israel launched a mission dubbed “Peace for Galilee”, a term which
not only represented the official rhetoric from the Israeli government, but implied that Israel
aimed to ensure ‘peace’ and ‘security’ and. The true nature of the operation, i.e. the military
action to invade Beirut and to impose US-Israeli dominance on Arab neighbors was concealed,
and the invasion was justified as necessary in order to protect the border areas and destroy the
“nests of terrorists.”195
Furthermore, the brutal warfare and mass slaughtering that occurred during the invasion illegal by international standards - received little critical attention or denouncement and had no
consequences - be it legal or diplomatic - for the Israelis. What was stressed in public discourse
instead was Israel’s claim to have warned the Lebanese population, ignoring the fact that such
warnings were, of course, to no avail, for the civilians simply did not have the time to escape.
Throughout the assaults on Gaza in 2006 and 2008 not only time was an issue, but also space, as
the people under attack - already imprisoned by Israel's closing of the border crossings - had
virtually nowhere to escape.
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Another theme utilized to bend the truth of Israel’s warfare is what Chomsky calls the
“cease-fire-exploitation-doctrine.” Rather than prescribing an actual end to the war, the Israeli
policy of announcing a ceasefire constitutes merely a cessation of the shooting, as doing so
works to the aggressor’s advantage.196 In the war on Lebanon in 1982, ground forces stopped the
gunfire but stayed in place to ensure “stability” in the “security zone” (read: occupy southern
Lebanon), whereas Gaza remains under occupation, with its borders tightly closed, just as it was
before the attack in December 2008. As of this writing, a truce between Israel and the Palestinian
factions (i.e. the corrupted Fatah and the ruling Hamas) has not been accomplished. Finally, the
unilateral ceasefire is always made at a time most advantageous to the aggressor. It either
benefited Israel to use the time of 'rest' for reinforcement, or it helped sustain the image of the
‘desire’ for peace.
In addition to Israel’s image of wanting ‘peace and security’ for its own people,
especially in the settlements of the border areas, it is also portrayed as the ‘liberator’ and
‘benefactor’. In the case of the war on Lebanon in 1982, the Christians were portrayed as being
in need of rescue from the terrorist activities of the PLO and the Syrians. In the wars on Gaza
since the beginning of the rule of Hamas, Israel’s military action has been justified as bringing
good to the Palestinians in Gaza, who are conceived to be harmed by Hamas’ terrorist rule rather
than Israel’s decade-long oppression.
The benign character of Israel’s military operations is further enhanced through its
alleged adherence to the “Jewish doctrine” of tohar haneshek, i.e. “purity of arms”, according to
which Israeli forces only strike strategic targets, buildings and places from which the enemy - be
it terrorist PLO or Hamas - was deemed to be operating. The realities on the ground, however,
generally show a very different picture of majority civilian casualties and numerous towns and
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villages destroyed. An account of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 by Mordechai Bar-On,
a Peace Now activist who viewed the PLO as “malicious, vicious and cruel” confirms:
Anyone who visited Southern Lebanon during and even after the fighting would see that the war was
fought not just against terrorist organizations and the PLO, and not even solely to destroy the PLO’s
military infrastructure in the region. It was fought against the very existence of the Palestinians as a
community with its own way of life, … [against the] health and educational services, political and
social organizations, judicial and self-management systems, etc. Now that all these autonomous
social systems have been utterly destroyed, the Palestinian refugees have once again become a
faceless mass of people, uprooted, evacuated and torn away from any form of collective life.197

Also consider the power of terminology after the outbreak of the second intifada, when
US embassies in the region were instructed by US Secretary of Defense, Colin Powell to no
longer refer to the Palestinian territories as ‘occupied’ but as ‘disputed’.198 This change in
terminology delegitimized Palestinian resistance, for a struggle against an illegal occupation considered an act of war under international law - may be justified, whereas downgrading the
intifada to a ‘dispute’ suggests something that might be settled through talks and negotiations.
The unequal representation of the two sides continued during this ‘dispute’. Thus, whereas an
attack on an illegal settlement in the West Bank killing four Israeli settlers was referred to as a
‘massacre’, the preceding onslaught of the town of Jenin - killing some thirty armed Palestinians
but also 24 civilians - did not qualify as such.199
The verbal abuse for Palestinians in public discourse has been another significant
component of the representation of the conflict. They have been bestialized, robbed of their
identity, deprived of their collective history and memory as they were turned into “cockroaches
in a glass jar”, “serpents” and “crocodiles”. Over the decades, Palestinians have been portrayed
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as nothing but a “cancerous manifestation” against which “chemotherapy” (i.e. military actions
by Israeli ‘Defense’ Forces) is the only “cure”.200 How easy is it then to designate these people
“outside the boundaries of reason” as terrorists who simply couldn’t be talked to and negotiated
with?201
The label of terrorism may be the most powerful tool used to curtail the legitimacy of
resistance against imperialist expansion, invoked when deemed beneficial as part of a greater
political and economic strategy. There seems to be indeed a particular ‘logic of terror’ operating
within Harvey’s territorial logic of coercive power. Like any other branding of similar notion it is
generally applied in isolation from any situational and historical circumstances, taken out of
context, ignoring the representation of the socio-spatial environment which gave rise to the social
action deemed ‘terrorist’ in the first place.202 The terrorism label, hence, does not ask for the
causes of events, for the underlying symptoms, nor does it go into any structural, analytical
depth.
It should be noted that the current phase of the terror logic - the War on Terror launched
by the Bush administration - is by no means a new invention, for this war shows amazing
parallels to the war on terrorism launched by President Reagan in the 1980s. Even the policy
makers acting ‘behind the scenes’ are in many cases the same as under the Reagan
administration. Bush’s Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, acted as Reagan’s special
representative to the Middle East, whereas the American ambassador to the UN, John
Negroponte, represented diplomatic relations in Honduras.
Given that terrorist practices and accusations thereof have been part of politics and
warfare for quite some time, it seems a curiosity that neither politicians and diplomats (including
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the United Nations) nor intellectuals and scholars have succeeded in providing a general
definition of what constitutes terrorism, a fact which in itself speaks for the power of the term.
As the “academic specialist” on terrorism, Walter Laqueur, explained, “no definition of terrorism
can possibly cover all the varieties of terrorism that have appeared throughout history: peasant
wars and labor disputes and brigandage have been accompanied by systematic terror, and the
same is true with regard to general wars, wars of national liberation and resistance movements
against foreign occupiers.”203
Nonetheless there have been numerous resolutions addressing the issue of terrorism
passed by both the UN Security Council and General Assembly. In 1987, the GA approved
almost unanimously a resolution that generally condemned terrorism and sought to prescribe
measures for its prevention, yet also reaffirmed
the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under colonial and racist
regimes and other forms of alien domination, and upholding the legitimacy of their struggle, in
particular the struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance with the purposes and
principles of the Charter and of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations.204

Most notably, only two countries voted against the resolution: the US and Israel, precisely
because of this clause, which at the time was directed at the Apartheid regime in South Africa
and Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The rejection of the resolution is
perspicuous if we consider how the concept of terrorism is employed in political and public
discourse by the US, Israel and other clients or allies, which is clearly not in congruence with the
above mentioned clause.
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This lack of a proper, unanimously agreed definition, however, makes the label of
terrorism more easily applicable, particularly to concepts considered a threat to the structural
system and the rule of those making accusations of terrorism, i.e. those in control of
representations of space (conceived space). Thus Israel has been free to apply the ‘terrorism’
label not only to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and elsewhere, but also to their leadership,
especially when the latter poses an increasing threat to the status quo.
The story of Israel’s relationship with the PLO is worth considering here. While initially
being treated in similar manners as at present Hizbollah and Hamas - i.e. as a ‘terrorist’
movement that cannot be negotiated with and whose ‘terrorist’ activities pose such a threat to
Israel’s security that in 1982 a war against the PLO’s host country, Lebanon, was not simply
justified but ‘unavoidable’ - Israel’s attitude towards the PLO changed significantly throughout
the 1990s, when a new label was put on the diplomacy table: the ‘peace process’.
The revival of the peace process came at a time of waning popular support of the PLO as
accusations of corruption, opportunism and disrespect for the people’s interests grew wider and
louder. Facing the internal threat of competition from increasingly popular movements such as
Hamas, the PLO became more open towards US-Israeli peace initiatives. In the aftermath of the
Oslo Accord, Arafat was presented as having been ‘forced’ by Israelis to accept the latter’s terms
for a peace agreement.
After Arafat’s concessions and official recognition of Israel - the price he paid to be
removed from the terrorist list - the PLO’s place as the terrorist enemy was taken by Hamas and
Hizbollah. Both have been repeatedly discredited as terrorist movements, which facilitated
numerous military campaigns by Israeli ‘Defense’ Forces. A point in case is Israel’s 1993 attack
on Lebanon, dubbed “Operation Accountability”, where history was rewritten by shoving the
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truth - namely, that Israel had been the aggressor - down the Orwellian memory hole and
creating the ‘fact’ that it was Hizbollah who had “started the latest round of fighting in an effort
to sabotage the peace negotiations and provoke a wider conflict."205 A similar process preceded
the most recent war on Gaza, were the official story defied the fact that it was Israel, not Hamas,
who had broken the ceasefire, presumably placing Israel once more into the position of the
victim. Once the public was made to believe that Hamas is a ‘threat’ to Israel it was easy to
justify and gather international support for an all out war on the people of Gaza.
Edward Said pointed out that the terrorism label is never used by those allegedly
performing acts of terror, but by those who consider themselves as under ‘attack’.206 Serving to
classify ‘our’ enemies, who are against ‘our’ policies, values and morals, the label is often
associated with a threat to our “stable identity”, based on our nationality, religion, culture and
tradition - the values of which are often not shared or at times contested by marginalized groups
who seek to define themselves on other grounds.207 In other words, the ‘terrorism’ label is
intrinsically linked with the scalar fix of identifying ‘us’ against the ‘other’. In Said’s words, this
is facilitated by a
limited access to the media coupled with an almost perfect correspondence between the ideology
ruling the presentation and selection of news (whose agenda is set by certified experts hand in hand
with media corporate managers) on the one hand, and prevailing government policy on the other,
[which] maintains a consistent pattern in the U.S. imperial perspective toward the non-Western
world.208

What’s more, the implication of ‘us’ being the ‘good’ who are threatened by ‘them’
further legitimizes any actions we do in order to extirpate the ‘evil’. The label or, to use Said’s
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term, “enveloping cloud” of terrorism provides easy justification for oppressive measures against
Palestinians in Israel or the West Bank and for destructive wars in Lebanon or Gaza.209 It turns
Palestinians into ‘two-legged beasts’, a ‘cancerous growth’ that needs to be eradicated by Israel the conceived showcase for peace, freedom and democracy in the Middle East.
The ‘other’, representing an unknown threat to us, to our very existence, is silenced and
does not nearly receive the same representation in the media or public discourse; and if so a
largely negative image is portrayed. As the Palestinian narrative has been subject to
“memoricide”, the struggle of the people becomes increasingly difficult. As Said described this
form of dispossession:
With no acceptable narrative to rely on, with no sustained permission for you to narrate, you feel
yourself crowded out and silenced. No permission to narrate. Anything further you might wish to
say or do is likely to become “terrorism.”210

Finally, any opposition to the unjustified use of the terrorism label seems almost
impossible, if one wants to avoid being placed in the same category as the ‘terrorist’ enemy. As
we recall George W. Bush’s oft repeated statement launching the new War on Terror after the
attacks on September 11, “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.”
The extent of the power of the ‘terrorism’ label, is summed up distinctly by Robert Fisk
who observed that it
has become a plague on our vocabulary, the excuse and reason and moral permit for state-sponsored
violence - our violence - which is now used on the innocent of the Middle East ever more
outrageously and promiscuously. Terrorism, terrorism, terrorism. It has become a full stop … the beall and end-all of everything that we must hate in order to ignore injustice and occupation and
murder on a mass scale. Terror, terror, terror, terror. It is a sonata, a symphony, an orchestra turned
to every television and radio station and news agency report, the soap-opera of the Devil, served up
209
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on prime-time or distilled in wearyingly dull and mendacious form by the right-wing
‘commentators’ of the American east coast or the Jerusalem Post or the intellectuals of Europe.
Strike against Terror. Victory over Terror. War on Terror. Everlasting War on Terror. Rarely in
history have soldiers and journalists and presidents and kings aligned themselves in such
thoughtless, unquestioning ranks.211

It must be noted here that the present discussion of the misuse of terrorism accusations as
a power tool in the Palestine-Israeli conflict is not to say that terrorist acts have not been
committed by Palestinian factions. Nor should such acts go without strong condemnation and
punishment. Whereas the right to self-defense and resistance to an illegal occupation should
never be denied, the killing of innocent Jewish children in a restaurant in Jerusalem, along with
other similar acts, is clearly unacceptable. At the same time, these crimes must be put in the
necessary socio-historical context, not as to downplay them, but in order to comprehend the
complex situation. For indeed the utter desperation of the Palestinians, out of which the
motivation for carrying out such cruel and violent acts develops, has been given minimal
attention in public Western discourse. Its adherents are thus missing a point which is key to
understand and unravel the Palestine-Israeli conflict.
Whereas the Palestinian resistance has become synonymous with terrorism, what is
entirely ignored in the public discourse is the Jewish ‘share’ in using acts of terrorism to achieve
political goals. Zionist terrorism was first utilized under the British Mandate to fight both Arab
resistance as well as British restrictions on Jewish immigration. It is indeed ironic that the State
of Israel, which now justifies its expansionary, offensive wars against the Palestinians and
Lebanese with its claims to fight the ‘war on terror’, was established largely with the aid of
terrorist campaigns.
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Even more ironic is the fact that the most notorious and influential leaders of the terrorist
groups active throughout the 1930s and 1940s, until the objective of an independent Jewish state
was achieved, were later to become leading, internationally respected politicians. Most notable is
the case of Menachem Begin, Nobel Peace Prize laureate of 1978, who in his early years was the
leader of the Irgun and as such responsible for the bombing of the headquarters of the British
military administration in Jerusalem, the Kind David Hotel, in 1946.212 Killing 91 people and
leaving many more wounded, the attack was the biggest terrorist action committed by the Irgun,
although by no means the only one. The organization regularly abducted British military officials
and executed them in such a brutal manner prompting the London Times to comment: “The
bestialities practiced by the Nazis themselves could go no further.”213 The Irgun was also,
together with the terrorist Stern Gang, involved in the massacre of Deir Yassin and other
Palestinian villages during the ethnic cleansing in 1947/48.
The use of terrorist measures was by no means abolished with the establishment of the
Israeli state, for the building of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories has been
accompanied by perpetual acts of settler violence against Palestinian civilians. Israeli
fundamentalist groups, first and foremost Gush Emunim, with which some 35% of settlers are
affiliated, have strongly rejected the accords of Oslo and responded with violence, fearing that a
peace agreement would lead to the dismantling of the settlements.214 The bloodiest act of settler
violence was the 1994 massacre in Hebron, where Baruch Goldstein, a member of the
fundamentalist group Kach, killed 29 Muslim worshippers and wounded dozens more in the
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Ibrahimiya Mosque.215 Israel responded to the escalating conflict by imposing curfews and
closures on the territories which in return spurred further terrorist acts by both Palestinians and
Israeli settlers. As a result, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli
fundamentalist, Yigal Amir, who believed that “God wanted Rabin dead in order to stop the Oslo
process.” As one scholar has argued, the settler violence and their repeated warnings of an Israeli
civil war, if settlements were abolished, explain the failure of the Oslo peace process and Israel’s
reluctance to agree to an evacuation of the settlements. 216

Conclusion
This chapter examined various fields of dissemination and production of knowledge in
order to understand how they are utilized by the Zionist enterprise to legitimize its practice of
dispossession. As each field was analyzed in its effectiveness as a social factor, or Relation, in
the dialectical sense we can now see how the scalar fix of knowledge has not only shaped the
common view of Palestine, but indeed helped to scale the historiography of the Palestine-Israeli
conflict and to deliberately suppress the formation of a distinct, authentic Palestinian narrative.
The power of the scalar fix of knowledge becomes apparent when considering the
2008/09 war on Gaza, which presents a continuation of the perpetual denial of truth about the
dispossession of the Palestinian people. As the many violent outbreaks of the conflict over the
decades, the presentation thereof in public discourse fails completely to place a single event into
the overall picture. It is this scalar fix of our conception of the socio-spatial environment, which
has brought us to a point where the opening of the borders to Gaza for a few days is considered a
great achievement, or the release of ONE Israeli soldier captured by Hamas is the decisive factor
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of peace negotiations which are to end the blockade of Gaza which has imprisoned 1.5 million
people for nearly two years.
To the extent that education, media representations and public discourse shape our
understanding of things and affect our levels of comfort or insecurity, an analysis of the scalar
fix of knowledge exposes acts of dispossession that go beyond the absolute, material space of
land and water rights and the conceptualized space of maps portioning the land of Palestine,
issues which were addressed in chapters 4 and 5. The scalar fix of knowledge indeed infiltrates
the lived space that often forms images and opinions about our environment and thus affects our
social behavior and activities. In other words, our analysis has taken us further down and to the
right of Harvey’s matrix of spatialities, i.e. in the realms of the lived and relational spaces. This
allows us to proceed to the core of the issue: the Zionists’ aim to oppress any efforts to establish
a genuine, authentic Palestinian social structure and thus to prevent the consolidation of a
Palestinian identity.
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CHAPTER 7:
THE SCALAR FIX OF IDENTITY
Oh past, do not change us... the further away we move from you! Oh future: do not ask
us: who are you? And what do you want from me? We too have no clue. Oh present,
bear with us a little, we are no more than dreary passers by!
Identity is our legacy and not our inheritance; our invention and not our memory.
Mahmoud Darwish217

In extension to the analysis from the previous chapter, the final section of the analysis
part of this thesis investigates the notion of identity in its function as a scalar fix. As I have
argued in chapter 2, the power of identity should not be underestimated, for the Zionist course of
action over the decades, as well as the Palestinian response to it, can be ascribed to a large extent
to the practice of scaling identity. Realizing the potential of a solidly constructed identity, the
Zionist/Israeli objective has been to actively dispossess the Palestinians of their identity. On the
other hand, the consolidation of a strong Zionist identity has served as a scalar fix which has
been essential as a tool of domination. This chapter will examine both these aspects of the scalar
fix of identity. In doing so, identity is understood as a social Relation in the dialectical sense,
making it clear that the consciousness of identity determines people’s social action, while at the
same time identity is shaped through the impressions of a constantly changing social
environment.
The scalar fix of identity is reinforced through the notion of an ideology of difference
which manifests itself in discourse and the use of certain terminology (see chapter 6), and draws
on fears and emotions that feed into the perception of ‘us’ vs. the ‘other’. In that sense, the
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awareness of the difference between Zionist Jews and non-Jews - artificially enhanced through
the scaling of the particular knowledge about one another - translates into the differential
treatment of Jews and Palestinians in all types of spatiality. Building on this notion of difference,
the Zionist-Jewish identity has assumed superiority over the Palestinians, forcing the latter into a
permanent position of defense and resistance - thus creating a situation of permanent struggle
which defines the Palestinian identity to a great extent.
As a consequence of this feeling of superiority, reinforced by the Zionist notion of having
the undeniable right to the land of Palestine, the dispossession of the indigenous Arabs is
justified and undisputed in Zionist historiography. From the very beginning, the Zionist
movement set out to establish an exclusive society that distinguishes between Jews and nonJews, the ultimate objective being the annihilation of the latter to provide Lebensraum (living
space) for the former. It must be noted here that this notion of a Jewish identity is not all together
confined to the religious tradition of Judaism. On the contrary, it is primarily based on the
Zionist ideology which bears little resemblance with the practice of the Judaic faith.218 Thus,
complementary to political, economic and military means of dispossession, the Zionist project
has been supported by a narrative designed to make the infamous slogan of ‘a land with no
people for a people without land’ become true. While considerable efforts have been made to
suppress the consolidation of a Palestinian identity, this Zionist tale has been nurtured to support
and enhance a Jewish identity as conceived through the lens of Zionism.
In that sense, the State of Israel was established as a Jewish state for all Jewish people,
including both residents of Israel and the diaspora.219 This Zionist-Jewish identity is justified on
religious, traditional and historical grounds, whereby the theological claim that the Jews are the
218
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“chosen people” who have a right to the “Holy Land” reinforces the sequence of events
representing more than 2000 years of suffering and exile - from the story of slavery in ancient
Egypt, to centuries of oppression by various empires in the Middle East, to the more recent
tragedy of the pogroms in Eastern Europe and finally Germany - which is thought to be the
unique fate of the Jewish people.220 This “collective memory of persecution”221 - has been held
up to consolidate the Zionist narrative and gain support also among non-Zionist groups. In the
face of changing spatial and historical contexts coupled with waves of Palestinian resistance, the
Zionists had to continuously reinforce and reassert their own history - a history of persecution
culminating in the Holocaust - assuming that it legitimize their claims to the land of Palestine
and their course of action in Israel. A great many Holocaust survivors, their children and
grandchildren hold on to the narrative of their agony and continue to live “in that time”.222 Thus,
the Holocaust - the term being trademarked through capitalization - itself becomes a
manifestation, a tragedy that does not compare to any other mass slaughter of any other people.
Hardly ever do we hear the word used in connection with other acts of ethnic cleansing such as
those in Armenia, Rwanda and Darfur, or that of the Palestinians in 1948. The notion of the
Holocaust thus becomes an immensely powerful tool in the Israeli narrative.
To the very extent that the Zionists have consolidated their narrative, the Palestinians
have been deprived of their history, being denied the “permission to narrate.”223 What has
translated into a conceived non-existence of the Palestinian people evolved in different stages,
whereby the transition from one to another has been - similar to the evolution of the Zionist
narrative - determined by the socio-spatial circumstances and the real Palestinian existence - i.e.
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the lived space of Palestine with all its anger and frustration, fear and desperation, but also hope
and patience. As long as the Palestinian resistance did not pose a considerable threat to the
Zionist project, the Palestinian people could be widely ignored. It was only after the rise a
formidable resistance movement, which could not be easily defeated, that the disregard for the
Palestinians was turned into more aggressive efforts of denial in mainstream media and public
discourse (see chapter 6). After such efforts, along with military means, failed to curtail the
Palestinian resistance - which escalated in the first intifada - the tactical denial took on a new
shape in the pretense of ‘acknowledgement’ and willingness to ‘compromise’. The ‘Peace
Process’ came to the fore, promising the Palestinians equal treatment and sovereignty at last. Yet
the Palestinians were forced to make considerable concessions so that the ‘Peace Process’
resulted in the very opposite of what they had demanded: the consolidation of the Zionist project
and the destruction of any hopes for Palestinian sovereignty.
The groundwork for denial of Palestinian identity and self-determination was laid during
the days of British rule, when Palestinians were not referred to as Palestinians or Arabs but as
“the non-Jewish communities.”224 In that sense, the very term ‘Mandate of Palestine’ is in fact
misleading, as the British did not carry out their mandate to develop a state according to selfdetermination of the indigenous people. It was rather a Mandate of Zionism, for the Zionist
project was allowed to flourish, building a quasi state within the British Mandate, at the expense
of the Palestinians.
This denial was further facilitated by the lack of cohesion of the Palestinian society,
which had been highly fragmented from the beginning due to competing loyalties to class,
religion, a city or region. While recognizing the Zionist threat as early as the late 19th century,
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Palestinians failed from the very beginning to unite and overcome their internal schisms.225
There is no doubt this problem has had a debilitating impact on the formation of sound, genuine
Palestinian leadership, not to mention the development of a meaningful resistance that goes
beyond the use of violence.
This notion of a lacking Palestinian narrative is not to downplay the continuous
representation of ‘Palestinianism’ through a small but respectable group of intellectuals, artists
and activists who have been trying to reach out to the public with their cause. To be sure,
Palestinian writers and scholars, along with those favorable of the Palestinian cause, have
continuously given lectures and published books and articles, yet most of them address merely
one issue of the overall conflict. Indeed, as Said notes, a comprehensive Palestinian narrative presented by Palestinians themselves - has not been permitted to enter public discourse in the
West.226 To the extent that holistic accounts have been attempted, they are usually written under
a certain perspective, based on a particular paradigm that fails to embrace the evolution of the
conflict as a whole. Hence, such tireless efforts pale alongside the compelling mass of negative
representations of the Palestinian people, peaking in its alleged non-existence.
What we are left with are fractions of an incomplete story of a people whose existence
has been denied for decades, and whose identity has never been allowed to fully unfold. These
fragments are often the result of attempts to build this Palestinian narrative, the result of feeling
the need to explain the story of the Palestinians ‘from scratch’ whenever the issue of the conflict
is addressed one way or another. Ironically, it is especially at times of major violent outbreaks,
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defined by Israel’s usual, disproportionate military preponderance over stone-throwing schoolchildren and handmade rockets, that the narrators of such fragments raise their voices.227
Why does the Palestinian cause not get heard? Or if it does, why is not treated with the
due respect and sincerity? The few scholars who did point towards the striking similarities of the
Palestinian situation to that of American Indians or Apartheid South Africa (for indeed, Gaza has
been referred to as Israel’s “Soweto”228) have gone largely unheard. As Edward Said observed,
the separation between Jews and non-Jews - both in physical space and the representation thereof
- has “been translated ideologically into a separation of that practice from all other similar
practices.”229 In other words, it is due to the scalar fixes of dispossession deliberately designed
by the dominant forces, that the highly unequal treatment of Palestinians has not found much
recognition among policy makers and intellectuals in the West. Unless this key issue is fully
recognized and appreciated, there is no end to the Israeli-Palestine conflict in sight.
I therefore conclude that the scalar fix of identity lies at the core of Israel’s perpetual
policy of dispossession which it has carried out with virtual impunity. This only becomes clear if
we approach the issue from a dialectical perspective: the power of scaling identities, along with
other scaling practices that affect the psychologies of the lived space (i.e. anxieties, fears,
desires, dreams and memories), has a significant impact on how we conceptualize and
experience the world around us. In order to further our understanding of a complex conflict as
that of between Israel and Palestine, these are the issues further research on the subject should
focus on.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
8.1 Review of the Objective
The aim of this thesis was to examine the use of scalar fix as a deliberate function of the
all-encompassing dispossession of the Palestinian people and, hence, as a means of consolidating
power. A conceptual framework was therefore developed which linked the geographical concept
of scalar fix to the process of accumulation by dispossession, which Harvey defined as one of the
four key conditionalities of uneven geographical development. In addition to the theory of
uneven development, this concept also adopted Harvey’s matrix of multiple spatialities in order
to expand the use of scalar fix beyond the sphere of absolute space. Four different types of scalar
fix, in their function of consolidating power, were identified:
1) scalar fix of legislation and policy making
2) scalar fix of networking
3) scalar fix of knowledge

4) scalar fix of identity
These four scalar fixes were applied to the case of Palestine in order to analyze the underlying
processes of dispossession.
Both the conceptual framework and the analysis used dialectics as methodology. Given
its potential to expose underlying processes and causes of social change which might not be
revealed using common methodology in social studies, dialectics was found to be the most
suitable approach to a conflict as complex as that of Israel and Palestine.

8.2 Findings and Contributions
The thesis contributes to studies in human geography, in particularly studies of uneven
geographical development, with respect to theory as well as analysis of a specific case. From a

120
conceptual perspective, this study expanded on the existing concept of scalar fix by applying it to
Harvey’s multiple spatialities. In doing so, scalar fix proves to be an even more powerful tool
than shown in previous studies. A second theoretical contribution is the linkage of scalar fix to
the act of dispossession, a concept which furthers our understanding of the processes of uneven
development.
Using this framework to investigate the situation in Palestine, the thesis revealed some of
the methods used and efforts made by the dominating powers - the Zionist regime in Israel and
the United States - to legitimize Israel’s sovereignty and to suppress the formation of Palestine as
a coherent, functioning social entity. A detailed analysis of each of the four types of scalar fix
showed that they are all significant to Israel’s consolidation of power at the expense of the
Palestinian people. While it was shown that the formulation of legislation and policies have
scaled the territorial organization and social environment of Palestine in absolute, relative and
conceptualized space, the study also exposed the effectiveness of the practice of scaling
knowledge and manipulating people’s perception, thus affecting the lived space of emotions such
as fear, hope and desire. Furthermore, the investigation of the impact of networking showed that
this scalar fix is closely related to the scalar fix of legislation, for many documents and policies
that proved to be decisive might not have come about without the influence from firmly
established networking relationships. Similarly, the analysis revealed a close interrelation of the
scalar fixes of knowledge and identity as both influence each other. Moreover, both scalar fixes
have impact on - and are affected by - the sphere of lived space.
Finally, this thesis highlighted the utility of dialectics in several ways. As regards the
conceptual framework, the relational perspective of dialectics allowed it to conceptualize space
in its multiple facets and to expand scalar fix beyond the realm of the absolute. Furthermore, the
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dialectical modes of abstraction facilitated a comprehensive approach to analysis which revealed
the immense power and extent of the various scalar fixes utilized to dispossess the Palestinians,
reaching into all aspects of socio-spatial awareness. If viewed through the dialectical lens the
precarious situation of Palestinians, especially the nearly 5 million living in refugee camps, can
be put into perspective and understood as the result of more than a century of deliberate acts of
dispossession, while at the same time accounting for the shortcomings of their social structures
and struggles.

8.3 Constraints of the Study
The thesis shows several constraints which are primarily a result of the limited scope of a
master thesis. First, given the complexity of the Palestine-Israeli conflict, only a select few scalar
fixes could be identified and addressed. As indicated in chapter 3, there are scalar fixes
associated with all intersections of Harvey’s spatial matrix which need to be identified and
examined in further research.
Moreover, the scalar fixes investigated in this thesis have been only partially addressed
and require more in-depth analysis, particularly the scalar fix of networking and the scalar fix of
identity. With respect to Zionist policies towards Palestine, I suspect that networks as scalar fix
take on more dimensions than what has been examined in this study. For instance, Jewish
financial networks have been involved in funding immigration to Palestine, especially in the prestate era. In addition, the perpetual involvement of former Haganah, Irgun and Stern members as
well as their descendants in high ranking positions of Israeli politics indicates a well established
elitist network.

122
The scalar fix of identity opens up a rather broad field of analysis which could only be
hinted at within the framework of this thesis. Additional knowledge with respect to the
psychology of identity and identity formation may be required in order to facilitate further
investigation of its function as scalar fix.
Finally, the dialectics applied to the conceptual framework and analysis in this thesis is
largely based on Ollman’s work, Dance of the Dialectic. Other paradigms of dialectics - which
may open up additional approaches to analysis - are thus not taken into account and might place
restrictions on our potential understanding of the subject matter of this thesis.

8.4 Recommendations for Future Research
Drawing on these constraints several topics for further research become apparent. In
order to expand on the concept of scalar fixes of multiple spaces, future research is required to
identify additional forms of scalar fix associated with the intersections of Harvey’s spatial
matrix. This involves further examination of the processes of accumulation by dispossession, as
well as more in-depth analysis of the multiple spaces.
Moreover, as mentioned above, both the scalar fix of networking and the scalar fix of
identity provide subjects for further research. In order to gain a full understanding of their
effectiveness and potential to dispossess the Palestinians, both scalar fixes need to be examined
in more detail. While adhering to the dialectical approach, further study of the scalar fix of
networking could involve textual analysis of documents including internal correspondence,
meeting minutes and memoranda that illuminate the level of interaction and collaboration within
a certain network such as the Jewish financial elite. Future research of the scalar fix of identity
could address how identity is expressed through Palestinian arts and literature such as that of the
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late Mahmoud Darwish. Another research topic pertaining identity could examine how the
scaling and dispossession of identity affects the psychologies of the lived space of Palestinians
and how the resulting fears, anxieties, desires, dreams and memories translate into social action
and resistance to Israeli oppression.
In conclusion, this thesis is merely the beginning of a dialectical approach towards
understanding the dispossession of the Palestinian people and its role in the overall conflict
between Israel and Palestine. Considering the utility of dialectics for both theoretical framework
and analysis, it is essential that any future research with the objective to further our
understanding of the situation in Palestine approaches the subject from a dialectical perspective.
Only then can we account for the changes to a social structure without losing sight of the overall
picture. Only with dialectics can we reveal acts of “stealing the commons from under the goose”
rather than merely focusing on studies of “stealing the goose from the commons.”
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APPENDIX A

The following excerpt was taken from Khalidi, W. (1988). Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the
Conquest of Palestine. Appendix B. Journal of Palestine Studies, 18 (1), 24 - 33.
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APPENDIX B
The following case study is taken from the report, The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli
Settlements and other Infrastructure in the West Bank (pp. 106-109), published by UN OCHA, 2007.
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